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Abstract
Before discussing the future reforms, I shall recall the curious features of the current competition law regime that is likely to last for a year or two longer. I shall then consider the implications
of the proposed enforcement reform and the difficulties of predicting how it will work. Then I
will turn to the apparent radicalism but concealed caution of the proposed new rules on vertical
restraints and whether the proposed new powers of investigation for the Commission of the European Communities (or ‘Commission‘) are compatible with the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“Human Rights Convention”).

MODERNIZATION OF
EC COMPETITION LAW
Ian Forrester*
INTRODUCTION
It is a particular pleasure to be able to comment on proposals for reforms for which one has been calling over a long period.1 Before discussing the future reforms, I shall recall the curious features of the current competition law regime that is likely
to last for a year or two longer. I shall then consider the implications of the proposed enforcement reform and the difficulties of
predicting how it will work. Then I will turn to the apparent
radicalism but concealed caution of the proposed new rules on
vertical restraints and whether the proposed new powers of investigation for the Commission of the European Communities
(or "Commission") are compatible with the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms2
("Human Rights Convention").
My impression is that the proposals in philosophical approach largely respond to most of the institutional criticisms
with which we are familiar. The institutional and procedural
changes will be profound. While the long-term goals are commendable, many questions of procedure en route to those goals
are unsettled. The new regime will bring a great deal of uncertainty to large corporate groups who operate in several Member
* White & Case/Forrester Norall & Sutton, Brussels; Blackstone Chambers,

London. Queen's Counsel; Visiting Professor in European Law, University of Glasgow.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Suzanne Innes-Stubb, Solicitor of
the Supreme Court of England and Wales; Andrea F. Gagliardi, Member of the Naples
Bar; and Walter M. Schuster, Member of the Brussels Bar, in the preparation of this
commentary on the papers submitted by Director General Alexander Schaub and other
panelists. This Essay is prepared from a speech given at the Fordham Corporate Law
Institute Symposium on October 14-15, 1999.
1. The period has indeed been long. I remember giving a speech in the summer
of 1982, shortly before the birth of my first son, orally advancing the ideas which were
set forth in the article I wrote with Chris Norall entitled The Laicization of Community
Law: Self-Help and the Rule ofReason: How Competition Law Is and Could Be Applied, in 1983
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 305 (Barry Hawk ed., 1984); 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 11
(1984). That son is now 17 years old.
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 1955 U.N.T.S. 220 (effective Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter Human Rights
Convention].

1028

MODERNIZATION OF EC COMPETITIONLAW

1029

States. Today, such groups are able to assess fairly accurately
their antitrust posture throughout the European Union (or
"EU"), but will in the future lose much of this confidence as
many more actors receive power to apply competition rules. Reducing these uncertainties should be an important concern of
the Commission.
I. RISK OF RE-NATIONALIZATION AND LESS
LEGAL CERTAINTY
The purpose of this gathering is to consider the broad implications and practical uncertainties, advantages, and disadvantages of the recently announced proposals for a fundamental reform in European competition laws. We have practitioners from
five countries, the head of a national competition agency, and
the Director General from the Commission. The latter says reform is indispensable and the methods proposed are the best
available. The other six express a variety of doubts, and the level
of hostility has risen during the balance of 1999. The comments
of my colleagues on this panel express a number of concerns, of
which two are prevalent: (1) that there is a risk of re-nationalization of the competition rules (the need for a "common competition culture," according to Erik Mohr Mersing); and (2) that
there will be a danger of losing legal certainty. Dieter Wolf indeed mentioned this concern very recently to the European Parliament. Mario Siragusa points out various plausible procedural
situations that would lead to uncertainty, as does August Braakmann. If one reads their papers (mine is no better), then one
could get the impression that the new regime is fraught with
risks.
Surely there are risks, but I think it would be unfair not to
acknowledge that the reforms will be praiseworthy and courageous steps for which we have all been calling. There will be
uncertainties and there will also be inconsistencies, but without
reform the situation will become intolerably obscure. Reform is
indispensable, and the Directorate General IV ("DG IV') deserves praise for facing this problem boldly.
A. What Was the Problem?
European competition law functions in a manner quite different from what the words of the regulations and decisions
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would suggest. In theory, the system is based on a broadly interpreted prohibition, which catches many kinds of conduct regarded as routine and not in any way illegal or anti-competitive
by most business people. For example, exclusive agreements,
whereby one party promises to deal only with the other, are
widely regarded as pro-competition rather than restrictive. It
was clear, however, from the early days that the prohibition of
Article 81 (1) 3 (ex Article 85) applied to such contracts. These
contracts are prohibited by Article 81(1), void under Article
81 (2) 4 and fineable pursuant to Regulation 17/62,' unless exempted under Article 81(3).6
The procedural and institutional theory was that the parties
to a transaction which might be prohibited by of Article 81(1)
could, and should, present the facts about their agreement to
the Commission in the form of a notification. The Commission
would consider the pro-competitive merits of the deal by applying the four criteria set out in Article 81(3). The parties would
thereby avoid the nullity which otherwise would apply pursuant
to Article 81(2), retain immunity from fines, and, if eligible, receive an exemption.
Requests for a specific exemption were a necessary procedural consequence of the early decision of DG IV about how to
interpret Article 81(1). This decision probably seemed easy
when first announced. The question centered around whether
the basic prohibition of Article 85(1) should apply to all agreements which technically contain some competitive restriction as
part of a larger agreement intended to be pro-competitive. Or
should the prohibition catch only "bad agreements," namely
3. Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art.
81 (1), O.J. C 340/3, at 208 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 85, (ex Article 85) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Amsterdam amending the
Treaty on European-Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and
certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renumbering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
4. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 81(2), O.J. C 340/3, at 208 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 93 (ex Article 85).
5. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), art. 9(3), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-1962, at 89 [hereinafter Regulation 17/62].
6. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 81 (3) Oj. C 340/3, at 208 (1997), 37
I.L.M. 93 (ex Article 85).
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those which any cartel agency would want to prosecute? Should
European Economic Community ("EEC") competition law have
a rule of reason whereby the legality of a matter could be examined by the individual in light of the totality of its terms and
purposes? Or should the provisions of Article 81(1) catch any
clause that restricted competitive freedom? The infant EEC institution, facing ignorant or hostile enterprises, judges, and no
doubt, crafty legal practitioners, opted for caution. It would be
by the use of Article 81(3) as an escape valve and not by the
creative parsing of Article 81 (1) that competition analyses would
be made. So the core text of EEC competition law was a broad
prohibition whose consequences were mitigated by the availability of exemption.
One very important question, therefore, for national competition authorities whose laws are worded identically to the
Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") is
whether they will interpret the basic prohibition as the Commission did in the past, or as the Commission says it will interpret it
in the future. As we will see, that choice has major procedural
and substantive implications for the future. This early choice established the constitutional primacy of the Commission in applying the competition rules.' It had shared power with the national courts to interpret Articles 81 (1) and 82, sole power to
apply Article 81(3), and the duty to deliver the legal responses
for which its primacy and its interpretation of Article 81 (1) created a need.
For more common categories of agreement, such as exclusive distributorships or technology licenses, the Commission
promulgated block exemption regulations that granted an automatic exemption to contracts falling within their terms. These
block exemption regulations had some good consequences, but
they also had the effect of constituting a defacto minimum standard, indeed a compulsory standard in the eyes of industry.
7. Prior to the judgment of the European Court of Justice (or "Court") in BRT/
SABAM, Case 127/73, [1974] E.C.R. 51, [1974] 14 C.M.L.R. 238, the direct effect of
Article 81(1) was not established, so it was argued that only the Commission for the
European Communities ("Commision") could interpret Articles 81 and 82 and certainly only the Commission could grant exemptions. The Court in BRT/SABAM confinned that Articles 81 and 82 were part of national law, which could be invoked before
national courts. Thereafter, the Commission regularly encouraged the use of national
courts to enforce competition law and hoped that national courts award damages for
breaches of competition law.
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Many contracts might be regarded as legitimate by the parties
but, containing unblessed features, could not fit within a block
exemption. In theory, such contracts needed specific attention
from DG IV to be legally valid.
The reality was rather different. The issuance of an exemption was a major piece of rule making, not the mere answering
of questions raised by a private party. Exemptions were reserved
for flagship cases. Each exemption decision was preceded by an
elaborate series of meetings, exchanges of correspondence, and
in some cases, hearings. The actual decision was a lengthy review of all possible factual, economic, and legal issues. The
grant of an exemption was often conditional upon some very significant concessions by the parties.8 So while an exemption in
theory conferred a benefit, it would frequently be upon terms
deemed onerous; so onerous that many procedures remained
suspended for years (indeed forever), as the parties could not
reach consensus with DG IV. This in itself could not have been
criticized had the Commission the capacity to answer the
number of requests for exemptions it received. But plainly it did
not have that capacity. The statistics were astonishing.
In the thirty-seven year history of European Community (or
"EC") competition law since the adoption of Regulation 17 in
1962, only 222 specific exemption decisions have been issued.
One hundred and thirty-six of these were issued beginning with
the adoption of Regulation 17 until the end of 1979. In the ensuing period of nearly twenty years, there were only eighty-six
exemption decisions. Since 1981, Chris Norall and myself have
written an annual review of competition law developments. The
first part in each review is a report card noting the numbers of
notifications and complaints filed, the decisions taken, the fines
imposed, and the like. We were struck to observe how few decisions were taken by DG IV. They were so few in number that the
Commission emphasized comfort letters as an alternative way of
8. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 89/467, O.J. L 226/25 (1989) (granting exemption to UIP pursuant to Article 81(3)). In this instance, UIP provided undertakings
that, inter alia, no committee of UIP made up of UIP partner firms would discuss plans
to release, distribute, or market individual films of any partner. In its Decision in EBU/
Eurovision System, No. 93/403 OJ. L 179/23 (1993), meanwhile, the Commission
granted an exemption to allow the system, conditional upon the EBU and its members
ensuring that third parties had access, via a sub-licensing regime, to television rights
acquired collectively by the EBU.
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closing files. The number of open files thereby has been sharply
reduced in the last five years. The productivity of the institution
was in fact far higher than the number of scalps might imply,
since as well as comfort letters and other means of closing a case
without the procedural burdens of a formal decision, the work
of the institution included legislation and advice to individual
parties. Our observation, however, was that the Commission
normally did not and, according to the procedures by which it
had elected to be governed, physically could not take, formal
decisions routinely granting .exemptions in specific cases.
Thus, all the letters of advice prepared by young lawyers
(and a few old ones) which, after describing the broad scope of.
Article 81, the consequences of nullity, and the risk of fines,
stated that an exemption was available to cure the problem, were
wrong. The heart, or one of the hearts, of the enforcement
mechanism established for the competition rules was a fiction.
This phenomenon had major theoretical and practical consequences. Notifications were being submitted on the erroneous
assumption that huge fines might be imposed upon parties to
agreements that contained (technically speaking) restrictions on
competition (as these were conceived by DG IV's early theorists),
but which would have had a fair chance of receiving the Commission's formal or informal blessing if they had been notified.
In reality, fines and condemnations attached to conduct that was
in essence unacceptable and not to conduct th at would have
been eligible for an exemption had it been notified.
The best reason for notifying therefore was not to avoid
fines, but to obtain a tactical advantage in the event that the
other contracting party chose to try to evade its contractual obligations by arguing that EC competition law prohibited the deal.'
Thus, filing a notification that provoked no hostile reaction
from DG IV was a means of attaining the higher moral ground in
the event that a controversy arose. Most who notified did not
hope to receive an exemption (unless they had been badly advised) and probably hoped not to receive an exemption, as this
would only be accorded after commercially painful concessions.
The sagacious notified in the hope that they would receive no
reaction whatsoever. Thus, notification was a means of perpetu9. One client observed that this was equivalent to saying: "I have been living in sin
for the past several years without knowing it."
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ating and protecting oneself from challenges to agreements,
rather than a means for the ultra-scrupulous to obtain legal certainty.
Many agreements were prohibited by Article 81(1), and
thus, many agreements needed an exemption to gain legal validity. Hardly any specific exemptions were issued and only the
Commission could consider a request for an exemption, since
only the Commission could grant an exemption. Thus procedurally, the Commission's intervention was indispensable,
although practically it was unavailable.
The Commission's internal procedures were oriented towards eliminating imperfections in proposed decisions and not
towards taking decisions that were adequately reasoned and well
founded. It was (and is) easier to prevent the taking of a decision than to procure the taking of a decision. If in doubt, then
think again. The procedures were very cumbersome. One Director caused a mild uproar when he called on each of his staff
members to aim to take one decision every two years. It is also
relevant to note that the first twenty-five years of enforcement
were dominated by cases concerning goods distribution, and
above all, by the penalizing of any arrangement that hindered
cross border selling activities by traders. The Commission
uniquely used competition law as a tool of economic integration
by forcing business people to accept that even if economic conditions in different Member States varied greatly, the supplier
could not contractually prohibit cross border "free rider" selling.
This preoccupation with a political goal was matched by some
neglect of conventional trust-busting targets, such as cartels.
Although national courts were the obvious enforcement resource for competition rules, their theoretical competence was
greatly limited by their constitutional inability to grant exemptions. Nevertheless, judges would receive guidance from the
Commission in the form of either a comfort letter sent to a party
or other correspondence in the course of the administrative procedure that might indicate what way the experts' thinking was
moving. A comfort letter, even if it carried little legal weight,
carried huge conviction because of the authority and respect
ascribed to the Commission's views.
One possible solution to the Commission's incapacity to deliver legal answers for which its interpretation of the Treaty cre-
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ated a need would have been to share competence to grant exemptions with national courts or national authorities. Commentators and officials consistently opposed this solution over the
years, generally on the grounds that national judges could not
be trusted to handle the complexities of economic theory, that
there would be inconsistencies, and that the time to take risks
was not yet ripe.' 0 Another possible solution would have been to
change the basic interpretation of Article 81 so that instead of
reading Article 81(1) as a prohibition curable by a blessing
under Article 81(3) -an analysis that compels the intervention
of a competition authority-the analysis would consist of a combined examination of the merits of the transaction based upon
the entirety of Article 81. An alternative and a somewhat similar
approach would be to apply a more relaxed standard by which
certain provisions, which in their totality are likely to be regarded as pro-competitive, are held not to present competition
problems at all.
In 1982 we contended that the staff of DG IV constituted a
priestly class. They were keepers of the cult, fully acquainted
with its higher economic mysteries. Only they could decide on
difficult questions. They were based in Brussels, had been
formed by years of study and experience, were incorruptible
(and sometimes stern), and were superior in knowledge as well
as position to most of the laity. The business desirous of lightening its heart and disposing of its doubts could discern the lawful
way ahead only by making a confession to higher authority, and
not by its own examination of its conscience. I thus contended
that Brussels was to be regarded as a Catholic, not a Presbyterian, jurisdiction. 1 Barry Hawk, who after all teaches at a Jesuit
institution, has confirmed this proposition and built a more
comprehensive, indeed baroque, structure of the theological/
legal whimsicalities, extending to an entire page of the Global
10. Stephen Kon and Eric Steindorff had an interesting battle on this subject.
Compare Stephen Kon, Article 81, para. 3: A Case for Application by National Courts and
Giving National Courts Jurisdiction, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 541 (1982), with Eric
Steindorff, Article 81, para. 3: No Casefor Application by National Courts, 20 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 125 (1983). Compare Barry Hawk, System Failure:Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 973 (1995), with Ian S. Forrester, Competition Structures for the 21st Centuiy, 1994 FoRDHtAm CORP. L. INST. 445 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995).
11. Ian S. Forrester, Panel Discussion, The Role of Legal Counsel, in ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE ANNUAL ON EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW

Laraine L. Laudati eds. 1997).

373 (Claus Dieter Ehlermann &
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Competition Review.1 2 He accurately observes that whereas
subordinate sceptics such as Luther intellectually launched the
Reformation, the Popes (Karel and Alexander) are leading the
competition reformation.
It was argued by some commentators and all officials pronouncing in public that it was too soon to take risks by allocating
power to grant exemptions to national courts, as national judges
were unskilled in economics. There would be errors and inconsistencies. Grave and turbulent risks might result unless decision
making was concentrated at the center. There was a debate between what might be called the elitist priestly view (beware of
tainting the sacred spring, perfection is best, confusion is to be
avoided, national judges will make a mess of it), and the reformist view (if national courts could cope with medical negligence,
tax legislation, and many other complex issues, they should be
able to do a good job in a competition matter; and they should
also be able to constitute the enforcement resource needed to
ensure the effective respect for competition law in the Member
States).
Because there were too many cumbersome procedures,
there were too few decisions. Each decision, therefore, became
very important, its drafters aiming for perfection. As a result,
difficult decisions were delayed or never taken for fear of being
wrong. For example, carrying the case from start to finish in one
matter consumed less than nine months, the administrative
speed record (WVFA Filipacchi),13 but in another matter might
take 28 years (FordAgricultural: original notification in 1964, final decision in 1992). The Commission took only a few decisions a year, from fifteen in 1984, to ten in 1989, to eight in
1993. To be fair, the figures for 1997 and 1998 were higher.
And of these decisions, very, very few were formal exemptions.
These strange institutional facts gave an advantage to those with
Brussels-based lawyers who were experts in the hidden proce14
dures of the Commission.
Good though the times may have been for Brussels-based
12. Barry Hawk, EU 'modernisation. A Latter-day Reformation, GLOBAL COMP. REv.,
Aug./Sept. 1999, at 12.
13. WEA Filipacchi Music, 72/480/CEE, O.J. L 303/52 (1972).
14. Barry Hawk stated that "Many Scribes strongly urge undertakings to confess
and seek absolution .... This advice is not wholly unconnected to the Scribes' economic interests."
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practitioners, the system rendered poor service to small and medium-sized enterprises in distant cities. They and their lawyers
read the words and believed they should be taken literally. Understandably, there was excessive caution on the part of non-expert lawyers who advised their clients to notify for fear of fines,
when, in truth, there was no prospect of fines being imposed.
B. Why Is Change Happening Now?
Having made some familiar moans about how EC competition law did not work well procedurally, I must then make a firm
and unequivocal recognition that may seem inconsistent with
what I have just been saying. The thirty-five year period from
1963 to 1998 has unquestionably been one of success. Europe's
competition rules have been a great success, despite the quirky
procedural features just described. The broad lines of principles
have been laid out, as well as some fine lines. They are being
exported to Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, South
Africa, and elsewhere. New Member State competition laws
echo the very words of Articles 81 and 82, as in Germany and the
United Kingdom, for example. The Commission has encountered success in forcing Member States to obey the competition
rules when granting State aids or when operating public services,
a world first. Huge fines have been imposed on national industrial champions. Member State lobbying in favor of leniency for
those engaged in cartels has almost stopped. Judicial review has
been quite effective, although at times too passive. The Commissibn has won most of its court cases, but has had a number of
wholesome defeats. There has never been the slightest scandal.
Political factors of course favored that success. It is widely
accepted today that competition is a Good Thing and competition law an essential part of it. The Member States have accepted not only that competition is a necessary principle in legislating and regulating for an economy, but have also accepted
that the Commission shall have the power to enforce it on a supranational basis. The Western European economic model has
been accepted in Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the EC
has been called both a magnet and a model for those countries
during their emergence from the period of Communist govern-
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15

ment.
There are a number of historical events whose alleged historical origins have become so familiar that in retrospect, it is
surprising that the actors at the time were unaware of the evolution of events. For example, at its regular meeting a few days
after the assassination at Sarajevo in the summer of 1914, the
British Cabinet devoted no attention to the matter and Foreign
Office Ministers and officials dispersed for holidays with no inkling that war was imminent. In the case of EC competition law,
retrospection will probably identify a number of explanations of
why reform has happened now. The success of the 1992 program was one reason for the reform. The Commission's commitment to using (or abusing) the competition rules as a means
of achieving economic integration could therefore be moderated. The new political agenda from 1980 onwards, first in the
United Kingdom after Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister, was gradually accepted throughout Western Europe and offered reformist inspiration to Eastern Europe. Competition became part of the normal vocabulary of political and economic
discourse around the world. Within the Commission, the statistics on applying Articles 81 and 82 got worse as time went by,
and they were bound to get still worse as new Member States
arrived and as national courts became more receptive to competition law arguments but remained unable to grant exemptions.
By contrast, the Merger Regulation was a great success. Contrary
to the fears of many practitioners, the Commission showed that
it was able to deliver on time and with clarity scores of decisions
in a wide variety of industries to the general satisfaction of the
business community. Consequently, it was clear that the institution could deal with deadlines and emerge with credit. As to
personalities and personnel, we observed the departure into
contented consultancy of the Prussians16 and the arrival in eminence of young Turks, now led by a Director General who at his
arrival was not an expert in competition law (and was therefore

15. One of the most recent examples is the Lithuanian block exemption regulation, which was modeled on the Commission's vertical restraints proposal.
16. In conventional parlance, Prussians were the senior, generally German officials
who contributed enormously to the development of the law from the earliest years, one
of whom famously said to a young colleague unwholesomely interested in reform: Man
muss sauber denken-one should think clean thoughts.
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free of hard-wired and immutable assumptions), and a Commissioner with a taste for bold and visible deeds.
C. The New Enforcement World
Competition lawyers in Brussels have enjoyed thirty years of
specializing in the arcane trade of examining the personal and
professional factors relevant to whether a competition law drama
might erupt. The task will become more difficult as a result of
the reforms proposed by the Commission's White Paper on the
modernization of the rules implementing Articles 81 and 82 of
the EC Treaty' 7 ("White Paper"). The variables will have increased. According to the Commission, EC competition law is
currently relatively predictable.'i This is true, reflecting thirty
years of experience plus established Commission and court case
law. Above all, the enforcement equation is straightforward because there is only one main enforcement actor, namely the
Commission. When considering an agreement or practice that
has competition law implications, predicting what the Commission's reaction will be is usually the only enforcement prediction. Even if the matter ultimately is raised in a national court,
the final outcome will often reflect 19 the Commission's view,
rather than that of a national competition authority.
We have a certain expectation about how most agreements
and practices will be treated (or not treated, as the case may be)
by DG IV. A possible obstacle to cross-border trade or a highly
visible exclusive deal may give rise to great excitement and a filing under the Merger Regulation will certainly be handled energetically and rapidly, but many categories of transactions are not
likely to give rise to much reaction beyond a comfort letter. In
most cases, that is a welcome and comfortable analysis.
The White Paper proposes to change all this. There will be
more actors, new roles for existing actors, and new relationships
between existing and new actors. National courts and authori17. White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the EC Treaty, European Commission, COM (99) 101 Final (Apr. 1999); O.J. C 132/
1 (1999) [hereinafter White Paper].
18. See id. § 48 ("[A] fter 35 years of application, the law has been clarified and thus
become more predictable for undertakings.").
19. The view may be conveyed in the form of a comfort letter, administrative correspondence to one party or the other, or even hearsay pleading by counsel (for example,
I met Mr. DG IV and he told me I was right).

1040

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 23:1028

ties, empowered for the first time to apply Article 81 as a whole,
will handle restrictions of competition. There will be more
minds to read. The future of the crucial procedure of notification is doubtful. So there cannot fail to be an increase in unpredictability, certainly in the first few years.
II. NEW ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
A. The Commission
The White Paper reassures us at paragraph 83 that the Commission "has a special role to play in the application of Community law and in ensuring the consistent application of the competition rules." 20 The Commission will have to learn when guidance to Member State national courts and competition
authorities is essential and when intervention is either too timeconsuming to be useful or constitutes more interference than
assistance.
The White Paper at paragraph 70 notes that switching to a
directly applicable exception system with ex post control is now
possible because the
legislative framework in the competition policy area has been
considerably strengthened, and the reforms currently under
way on vertical restrictions and horizontal cooperation agreements will help to simplify and clarify it further... Furthermore, the national authorities and courts, undertakings and
their legal advisors have progressively gained a better knowl21
edge of Community competition law.
I consider that the draft Vertical Restraints Regulation,2 2 which
the White Paper describes as one of a "new generation" of block
exemptions 23 by no means confers all the legal certainty that its
drafters contend. I contend, in the next section, that the Vertical Restraints Regulation recalls the past age of enforcement philosophy, namely carefully calibrated concessions in the form of a
block exemption, strict limits to the concessions, thresholds, and
20. White Paper, supra note 17, § 83.

21. Id. § 70.
22. Proposed Commission Regulation on the application of Article 81(3) of the
EC Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, O.J. C 270/7
(1999) [hereinafter Proposed Regulation]. The final text was adopted on December
22, 1999, O.J. L 336/21 (1999).
23. White Paper, supra note 17, § 71.
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in a variety of situations where the liberalization will not apply.
There will remain great areas of uncertainty. It is unclear
whether future guidance from the Commission will reflect heretical boldness or-as one may fear-nervousness that regulatory
concessions may be abused in unforeseeable circumstances. The
Vertical Restraints Regulation has established market share criteria to limit the categories of companies that can benefit, even
though I believe the Commission has never once withdrawn the
benefit of a regulation because a company had too high a market share.
Commission guidance takes various forms: decisions, notices, block exemptions, regulations, comfort letters, and the Annual Report. Notices, decisions, and block exemptions are to
continue, but there is no mention in the White Paper of the future of comfort letters.2 4 Will they continue? Do we need them,
since they are not binding on national courts anyway? Is the
Commission expecting to receive no inquiries warranting written
confirmation less formal than a decision? The White Paper does
not seem to exclude comfort letters. Decisions, however, tend to
be substantive pieces of groundbreaking law rather than short
informative additions to existing case law, which could be conveyed in the form of a comfort letter. Many comfort letters, in
my respectful opinion, are either bland statements of the uncontroversial, or a terse record that the latest reluctant concession
by the company has been enough to allow the Commission to
close the file. Guidance, however, is always helpful and if the
Commission can be persuaded to make them public in some
form (anonymous ruling letters?) so much the better.
B. Notices, Guidelines, and Block Exemptions
Other than decisions, the White Paper notes that the Commission "would continue to adopt Regulations and Notices setting out the principal rules of interpretation of Articles 81 and
82" in order to "keep a leading role in determining EC competi24. Paragraph 35 of the White Paper on the modernization of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty ("White Paper") discusses the disadvantages of comfort letters but does not explain if they are to continue. Many commentators accurately point out that comfort letters are procedurally anomalous in that they
do not grant an exemption. I know of no case, however, where a national court has
chosen to ignore the Commission's conclusions as expressed in a comfort letter and
reach its own different conclusions.
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tion policy" as well as "guidelines to explain its policy and provide guidance for the application of the Community competition
rules by national authorities." 2 Whereas notices and guidelines
might not be binding on national authorities, they would
make a valuable contribution to the consistent application of
Community law, because in its decisions in individual cases
the Commission would confirm the approach they set out.
Provided those individual decisions were upheld by the
Court, then notices and guidelines would come to form part
26
of the rules that must be applied by national authorities.
How ready will the Commission be to trust the good sense
of the laity whom it is allowing to reach their own conclusions?
Will we see micro-management in a string of catechetic pronouncements? Probably not, if for no other reason'than that the
promulgation of any rule by the Commission is always preceded
by anxious consultation and inquiry over months and even years.
National courts and authorities will ask for assistance when they
need it. I do not expect the Commission will try to limit their
discretion by strings of policy rulings. Allowing Article 81 (3) to
"leave home" was inevitable if the growth of competition law was
not to be stifled. In the future, a wide number of influences will
shape EC competition law. Member States may see issues differently. But this is an opportunity for EC competition law to be
enriched rather than jeopardized. The Commission will be performing its role most usefully if it concentrates on the major
matters on which it has expressed a desire to focus, as well as on
uncertainties that are specifically put to it by national courts and
administrations.
C. Decisions
The Commission anticipates issuing three types of decisions
under the proposed system: negative, positive, and conditional.
At paragraph 87, the White Paper notes that:
Commission policy on competition would continue to be reflected in prohibition decisions in individual cases, and these
would be of great importance as precedents ... [thus] the
number of individual prohibition decisions can be expected
25. White Paper, supra note 17, § 14.
26. Id. § 86.
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to increase substantially. 27
This seems to suggest that the Commission will take more condemnation decisions, impose more fines, and take more proscriptive action. Increased enforcement activity against cartels,
for example, would not be opposed by anyone, but it is not clear
where the extra resources will be found. The Commission's current decision-making processes are too protracted, too slow, and
too procedurally burdensome. Because the machinery is so
cumbersome, officials have been obliged to seek mechanisms
other than formal decisions to close cases. It is not suggested
that there will be radical changes to facilitate the taking of
shorter, simpler, and quicker decisions. The Commission proposes the abolition of notifications on Form A/B seeking negative clearance or exemption, but it seems unlikely that the
amount of time represented by the handling of notifications
would be so substantial that if notifications disappeared then
more cartel decisions would be taken.
At paragraph 88, the Commission says that it would not
adopt exemption decisions under Article 81(3) as it does now
(for the reasons set forth above, I contend it hardly ever adopts
them now), but "should be able to adopt individual decisions
that are not prohibition decisions." 28 The Commission appears
to mean that it will adopt clearance decisions. Indeed
[I] t may be necessary to provide the market with guidance
regarding the Commission's approach to certain restrictions
taken
in it. Positive decisions of this kind would therefore be
29
in exceptional cases, on grounds of general interest.
These decisions are described as having a "declaratory nature" with the same legal effect as negative clearance decisions
which state that Article 81 (1) does not apply at all to a particular
agreement-in the 1990s-negative clearance decisions, have
been almost unknown. A third, new kind of individual decision
rendering commitments by firms legally binding is also suggested in the White Paper, although it is not suggested that national courts or authorities should have the ability to apply such
a measure. I have no objection to the proposed categorization.
I think regularity and quantity of output should be given more
27. Id. § 87.
28. Id. § 88.

29. Id.
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importance. The Commission should not be afraid to issue
more frequent, shorter decisions, from whose aggregation an
overall understanding of its policy will be easier. Decisions enrich and develop the law. The weakness of the past system has
been that for reasons of excessive procedural complexity and
limited administrative resources, there have been too few decisions. Yet, the Merger Regulation shows that with realistic deadlines, ,a steady flow of intelligently reasoned decisions can
emerge. I strongly submit that the adoption of internal deadlines for the taking of decisions under Articles 81 and 82 would
greatly help productivity and efficacy.
D. Notification
The discussion above leads to the query whether, despite
the fact that the Commission presents its White Paper as heralding the end of the notification system,3 ° some sort of notification
will still continue. We noted back in 1984 that in most cases,
notifications are made in order to obtain or to retain a commercial advantage rather than out of a sense of legal obligation:
"Many companies will notify only in the rarest circumstances, to
avoid the reproach of being negligent or willful infringers. A
few will notify as a matter of routine, wishing to be thought of as
good citizens rather than stonewallers." 3" I note that Dr. Alexander Schaub was recently reported as saying that the notification
system was "useless" as true problems were discovered via com32
plaints.
The Commission proposes at paragraph 79 of the White Paper that prior authorization (and hence notification) via the
Merger Regulation should continue to apply for partial-function
production joint ventures (to which a minimum level of assets
contributed and no block exemption applied) because of the
difficulties in unraveling this type of operation after the event
30. Id. § 12. This Article states that
The proposed reform involves the abolition of the notification and exemption
system and its replacement by a Council Regulation which would render the
exemption rule of Article 85(3) directly applicable without prior decision by
the Commission. Article 85 as a whole would be applied by the Commission,
national competition authorities and national courts, as is already the case for
Article 85(1) and 86.

Id.
31. Forrester & Norall, supra note 1.
32. See Bull. Quotidien Eur. No. 7557, Sept. 23, 1999 at 10 (Agence Europe).
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and if a competition authority challenges it. There will surely be
other categories of transactions in which the stakes are so high,
the investment required so great, or the difficulties of unraveling
the transaction afterwards so large, that the parties will be reluctant to enter the transaction without confidence that their arrangements are legal, especially in a period of change when the
relative roles of Articles 81(1) and (3) are being considered.
The Commission proposes at paragraph 88 of the White Paper
to adopt decisions where transactions raise "new questions." Is it
only intending to consider such issues when it spots them itself,
when it receives an inquiry from a national court or authority, or
when it receives a complaint from a third party? It would seem
illogical or at least inflexible to take the position that a formal
decision would be impossible unless a deal were challenged.
The White Paper, however, does not make clear if it intends to
exclude the filing of such notifications.
Much creative energy today is devoted to analyzing the procedural consequences of notifying an agreement. Against notification is the fact that the company is describing details of its business to a prosecutor, thus arming the prosecutor with elements
that might be used in a hostile manner. In favor of notification is
immunity from fines (usually a theoretical concern but occasionally a real one) and the appearance of propriety conferred by a
voluntary confession. Indeed, the process is abused in the sense
that many notifications are filed in order to gain what I have
called the higher moral ground in case of a future dispute between the parties to the agreement. The notifying party often
fears that the other party to the agreement may have second
thoughts years later about the commercial benefits of the deal,
and may invoke EC competition law to argue that the agreement
was void under Article 81 (2). It may be difficult to be confident
of the outcome. Therefore, the filing of a notification is a useful
prophylactic against tardy bad faith enthusiasm for the competition rules. The notifying party will be able to convey to its contracting partner that since a notification was filed and the Commission has not reacted, the transaction must therefore be acceptable.
The vice in the scenario I have described is not the filing of
the notification but the probability of inaction by way of reaction
and the misleading implication attached to the absence of reaction by the Commission's services. Deadlines would cure the

1046

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 23:1028

problem. An answer could be forthcoming inside, for example,
four months, stating either that the matter does not need attention because the Commission's posture is spelled out in existing
policy instruments (exemption regulations or notices), or that
the transaction appears acceptable. Alternatively, perhaps more
time is necessary to pronounce. There would be no opportunity
to misrepresent silence as a blessing, and there would be an opportunity to give guidance to genuine inquiries. Perhaps a small
fee could be charged upon the receipt of the notification. If
notifications disappear altogether, then enterprises will need to
trust that: (1) clear yet inadvertent infringements of the rules by
small companies would not lead to fines; (2) complaints about
freely entered transactions by those who wish to wriggle out of
them will be examined skeptically; and (3) unofficial advice will
be available informally from staff and is reliable.
Director General Schaub says that because notifications are
filed, they are actionable. They clog the in-boxes of officials
whose energies the Director General would like to devote elsewhere. They do not reveal real problems, which usually come to
the Commission's attention via complaints. I am surprised that
handling a relatively small number of notifications annually
should constitute such a grave burden, especially if some of
them would present issues to be addressed by national competition agencies, in which case they would not call for DG IV attention. I am also surprised that any enforcement agency would
turn its back on a voluntary but widely-followed procedure
whereby approval is sought for complex or difficult transactions.
If such an enforcement agency merely wished to discourage the
needless filing of notifications where the doubts are trivial, reflecting an excess of caution on the lawyers' part, then this
would be understandable.
I note that Dieter Wolf, from the viewpoint of a
Bundeskartellamt ("BKA") enforcer, favors notifications as allowing the competition authorities to play a useful role in shaping the notified agreement by either requiring modifications or
imposing time limits. It seems to me that a well-functioning notification system confers benefits on both the competition authority and the private party.
The problem in Brussels, I submit, is not the concept of a
notification system, but the fact that the existing system does not
function rationally. Too many notifications are called for by the
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current interpretation of Article 81 (1). Too many trivial matters
are therefore notified, out of needless fear of being fined. Some
notifications are recommended with a view to earning fees for
their drafting. The exemption procedure is ridiculously burdensome as a response to a simple request for guidance. Last, silence by the Commission is falsely represented as proving official
approval. Deadlines would cure many of these problems. Moreover, it should be noted that if we are designing a new regulatory
map, nothing requires that the Commission itself handle every
notification. It could send notifications for consideration to an
appropriate national authority, or it could send the notification
back as raising no significant competition law issue. Alternatively, it could respond within two or four months, depending on
the difficulty of the matter. I do not think that such a regime
would be "useless." I therefore agree with Mario Siragusa's remarks about legal certainty, which lead me to observe that complainants would seem to be in a better position (answer within
four months) than would-be notifying parties (no answer at all, it
would seem).
E. National Competition Authorities
How will national competition authorities apply Article
81(3) and withdraw block exemptions in their own territories?
Will their approach to EC competition law differ from that of
the Commission? Will they all finally be empowered to apply
Article 81 completely? A number of commentators have expressed the view that national competition authorities would be
better than national courts at applying and enforcing competition law. Claus Dieter Ehlermann noted that they would be
"more able than the judiciary to collect and appreciate the complex facts which are required to apply Article 81 and 82, provided they are adequately equipped with legal instruments and
33
human resources."
The last clause is crucial: compare Belgium (miserably
under-resourced, regularly criticized by the courts and in the
shadow of the Commission) with the United Kingdom (new
agency, new statute, new appellate structure, lots of resources,
widely supported by the local bar). In paragraph 46 of the
33. Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Implementation of EC Competition Law by NationalAntitrust Authorities, 17 EUR. COMp. L. REv. 88 (1996).
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White Paper, the Commission states that, "competition authorities... are normally well acquainted with local markets and national operators.., and can carry out investigations rapidly and
most of them have the human and legal resources needed to
take action against infringements whose centre of gravity is in
34
their territory.
It may be disputed whether national courts are less able
than national competition authorities to deal with the economic
content of a competition case. I think the real emphasis, however, should be on human and legal resources. Power devolved
from Brussels will dissipate if there is no legislative and human
infrastructure to enable national competition authorities to perform their new role.
It will be interesting to observe the experience of, for example, the BKA, in the new enforcement architecture. If the reforms occur soon, then the BKA will have to contend with not
only a shortage of personnel but also, having moved on October
1 from Berlin to Bonn (against the stream of government departments) an enormous change of personnel resulting from
the fact that two-thirds of its staff will stay in Berlin, most transferring to the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium. 3 5 Will the BKA's
new personnel be more or less ready to apply new rules than
officials accustomed to not applying Article 81(3)? This is only
one example, but changes in domestic politics, location, and
budgets may have an unpredictable effect on the passivity or activity with which national authorities apply Article 81. But at
least the BKA is explicitly empowered to apply Article 81(1).
The AutoritA Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato in Italy
has since 1997 been empowered to use the procedure, which was
set up in 1990 for the enforcement of Italian competition law to
enforce Articles 81 and 82. Before this law was passed, the authority did not have the power necessary to enforce EC law.
There is an Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") recommendation on cooperation between
antitrust authorities, but it seems not to have been used as a vehicle in Italy.
I am aware of at least one case in which a national competition agency in Spain has imposed a fine for breach of the EC
34. White Paper, supra note 17, § 46.
35. See Handelsblatt, Sept. 24-25, 1999, at 5.
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competition rules, rather than national rules. The White Paper
proposes that those Member States in which national competition authorities clearly do not enjoy the power to enforce EC law
should be obliged to accord those authorities the power to apply
Article 81(3). It does not clarify whether the replacement for
Regulation 17 will impose that obligation.3 6
F. National Courts
37
National courts will have an important role in the new era,
particularly in those Member States where national authorities
are weak or have not yet been empowered to apply EC competition law. I did not agree that national courts were not to be
trusted to apply EC law competently in the field of competition;
and confidence will grow as competition principles and common
sense draw closer together. It will be, however, highly desirable
for the Commission to maintain and expand its existing practice
of offering assistance to national courts who need either information about where a procedure stands or guidance on what
issues should be deemed relevant. Fear of appearing to take
sides has made the Commission's response time to national inquiries too slow and, as a result, unhelpful. This must change in
the new environment.
Candidate Member State's courts will also need assistance.
The help currently provided by Member States to applicant
Member States38 is a start, but with little experience in applying

36. White Paper, supra note 17, §§ 92, 94.
37. Note, after all, that the Court has said that national courts are responsible for
ensuring that Community law is applied and respected in the national legal system.
Zwartfeld, Case 2/88, [1990] E.C.R. 1-3365, [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 457. The Court of First
Instance in Tetra Pak referred to national courts as "Community Courts of general jurisdiction" when they handle competition matters covered by the EC Treaty. Tetra Pak
Ransing v. Commission, Case T-51/89, [1990] E.C.R. 11-309, 364, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 47.
It would be unrealistic to hope that the claim for compensation by (say) the patient
who received a blood transfusion contaminated by hepatitis virus would be handled
according to similar procedures within a similar time-frame and with similar levels of
damages throughout Europe. That said, we would hope that the results in two similar
cases would be generally similar. I accept as inevitable, though undesirable, that the
results in two competition cases allegedly presenting identical issues may be different.
This is a genuine drawback of the proposed reforms. It may cause dismay to a European enterprise that has prevailed throughout the EU if it loses in what it regards as an
unimportant corner of Europe because the constitutionally or economically relevant
facts came out in court badly.
38. In 1998, officials from the Lithuanian, Polish, and Slovakian competition authorities visited the U.K. competition authorities as part of the technical assistance pro-
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the basic EC competition rules, national courts from new Member States will face a difficult task in applying the full Article 81
scheme. There is a high probability of discrepancies, as feared
by Eric Mohr Mersing in his paper calling for steps to guarantee
a "common competition culture." Some discrepancies are inevitable and not in themselves undesirable, since they reflect social,
political, and economic features of different countries. Systematic confusion and disorder, however, are to be avoided.
III. NEW RELATIONSHIPS
The attractiveness of having Europe's premier competition
enforcement body examine a matter without court costs, coupled with the chance of reviewing the fruits of that examination
before the Court of First Instance, makes Brussels a much more
attractive place to launch a competition campaign than any
other city. 9 In addition, the fact that the Commission's intervention means that national competition authorities automatically lose their jurisdiction,4" and national courts can stay national proceedings until the Commission has taken a decision,
gives complainants little incentive to go to their national courts
and authorities.4 1 The Commission remains stimulated by complaints, and its receptivity to them ensures their arrival. A constructive relationship between the Commission and national
courts and authorities, emphasizing on complementarity and
mutual assistance, will help.
A. CoordinationBetween National Authorities
Present day cooperation between national competition authorities works well with mergers but is surprisingly limited with
respect to cartels and anti-competitive practices. There are
plenty of senior courtesy visits. For example, the U.K. Director
General of Fair Trading holds biannual round-table talks with
the President of the BKA. Regular visits also occur by senior
member of the Office of Fair Trading (or "OFT') to other EU
national competition authorities. In 1998, the Director General
grams designed to prepare their countries for eventual accession to the European
Union.
39. Forrester, supra note 10.
40. Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 5.
41. White Paper, supra note 17, § 39.
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visited the Netherlands and Sweden. In 1997, he held talks with
the Director General of the French competition authority. Staffexchange programs and secondments occur each year between
the Office of Fair Trading, the BKA, and France's Direction
Genrale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la R&
pression des Fraudes, to enable officials to meet their counterparts and exchange experiences and views on topics of mutual
interest. More sporadic visits occur between the United Kingdom and other Member States. In 1997, for example, a Portuguese official visited the OFT under the Commission's Karolus
Exchange Programme, which is aimed at improving communication and cooperation between Member States' authorities.
Doubtless there are other contacts and not just at a senior level.
It seems plain, however, that there is nothing approaching
the level of interstate cooperation that has been achieved in the
United States. Specifically, the U.S. National Association of Attorneys General ("NAAG"), established in 1997, has no counterpart in Europe. Two examples of major multi-state actions undertaken by State Attorney Generals in the antitrust field are the
antitrust suit filed in May 1998 by twenty States and the District
of Columbia against Microsoft for alleged abuse on the market
for Internet browsers, and the January 1997 settlement agreement with American Online ("AOL"), the online computer service provider, under which AOL agreed to pay refunds and
other concessions to subscribers who had difficulty accessing its
services. The NAAG holds a meeting concerning management
issues for all Attorney Generals each December and convenes for
two full membership meetings each spring and summer. It organizes federal-state workshops, sponsors seminars and conferences, publishes reports and monographs on a wide range of
topics, and serves as a liaison with the federal government, and
assists State Attorneys with appellate advocacy. The NAAG thus
provides a forum for states to discuss common issues, coordinate, and assist in investigations and enforcement of antitrust
prohibitions. Its Multi-state Antitrust Task Force, a permanent
subcommittee of the Antitrust Committee of NAAG, coordinates
multi-state investigations and litigation.4 2 If EU national compe42. Kevin J. O'Connor, Working Paper V, Panel on Decentralisationof Enforcement of
Community Law, in ANNUAL ON EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW (Claus Dieter Ehlermann &
Laraine L. Laudati eds. 1997).
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tition authorities had a similar permanent body through which
to coordinate actions, share costs, facilitate investigations, and
assist in enforcement, transnational enforcement would have arrived. Regional cases that encompass several Member States
could be addressed effectively by national cooperation. Unfortunately, I believe that this is very rare today. As Dieter Wolf recently said to the European Parliament, what really needs to be
intensified is cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission.4 3
B. Cooperation Between the Commission and National Authorities
At paragraph 91 of the White Paper, the Commission notes
that cooperation between the Commission and national competition authorities have
hitherto been on a pragmatic footing, and limited by the
Commission's exclusive right to apply Article 81(3) ...

the

time has come to make better use of the complementarity
that exists between the national authorities and the Commission, and to facilitate the application of the rules by a network
of authorities operating on common principles and in close
collaboration. 4
The Commission emphasizes flexibility and speed in cooperation.4 5 In order to enable the exchange of (sometimes) confidential information, it proposes an amendment to Article 21 of
Regulation 17 that currently prevents national competition authorities from utilizing information supplied by the Commission
as evidence. 46 The Commission is proposing that national authorities would be able to investigate cases either in response to
complaints or on their own initiative, but for the sake of consistency the White Paper proposes that competition authorities
should be obliged under the amended Regulation 17 to inform
the Commission of the pendency of cases involving Articles 81
and 82. Before the termination of such cases and whenever the
authorities intend to withdraw the benefit of a block exemption,
they should also give notice to the Commission of any proceedings under national competition law that may have implications
43.
44.
45.
46.

Bull. Quotidien Eur., supra note 32, at 9.
White Paper, supra note 17, § 91.
Id. § 104.
Id. § 96.

2000]

MODERNIZATION OFEC COMPETITION LAW

1053

for Community proceedings. The Commission is also proposing
that it should have power to remove a case out from national
jurisdiction by a mechanism equivalent to Article 9 (3) of Regulation 17.
One could be forgiven for thinking that the Commission
seems to be preparing for the worst by giving itself specific powers to reclaim cases from national handling. The Commission
may also be hoping for the best by relying on the inclusion in
the revised version of Regulation 17 of "a clear obligation for
national courts to avoid conflicts with Commission decisions," as
well as the obligation on Member States to ensure fulfillment of
treaty obligations imposed by Article 10 (formerly Article 5) of
the EC Treaty.48 In addition, the Commission is proposing to
upscale the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and
Dominant Positions to discuss cases irrespective ofjurisdiction.4 9
Could this bringing together of Member State authorities and
the Commission emulate the cooperation that exists between
federal and state authorities on antitrust matters in the United

States?5°
The 1997 notice on cooperation between the Commission
and national authorities 51 currently allocates cases between authorities and the Commission by various criteria favoring decentralization where the effects are felt mainly in or closely linked to
the territory, even if the practice or agreement theoretically affects trade between Member States, or Commission handling
(cases of particular Community interest, involving undertakings
with special or exclusive rights, or raising a new point of law, but
not simply because of their size). This would need to change to
the extent that national authorities will be able to apply Article
81(3) and "withdraw the effect of the block exemption on their
own territory if that territory or part of it constituted a separate
47. Id. § 105.
48. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 10, O.J. C 340/3, at 45-46 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 11 (ex Article 5).
49. White Paper, supra note 17, § 106.
50. The Executive Working Group for Antitrust ("EWG") in the United States
brings together representatives from the U.S. Department ofJustice, the Federal Trade
Commission, and state Attorney Generals to "coordinate overlapping state and federal
enforcement in order to avoid a duplication of efforts." The EWG meets three times a
year and subgroups deal with more specific problems as necessary.
51. Commission Notice, O.J. C 313/3 (1997).

1054

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol.23:1028

market."5 2 The criteria will presumably provide a basis for the
Commission to choose which cases it will remove from the national authority's jurisdiction.
These inter-institutional communings appear rational and
efficient. However, even if they work absolutely perfectly, and
experience teaches us that perfection is rare, it seems certain
that business consumers of competition law in Europe will be
faced with many more uncertainties. Up until the present time,
if the matter would affect several Member States, then the policy,
case law, and personnel of DG IV would be the main factors in
deciding on the legality (and therefore viability) of the transaction. If a controversy arose before a national court (or a competition authority, though then the analysis would be rather different), then a major element in concluding that controversy would
be determining the applicable rules of EC law as discernible
from the decisions of the Commission and the courts. But now,
each court and each competition agency is being encouraged to
reach its own conclusions without necessarily deferrence to the
experts in Brussels. In the early days, we may expect courts to
seek guidance from the Commission (explored further below),
but it cannot be likely that this will be routine: it will entail delay. Indeed, it may seem inappropriate unless the Commission
has already been involved, or it may seem constitutionally as an
unwelcome involvement of an external agency. Furthermore,
there are no assurances that the Commission's answers would
settle the difficulties identified by the judge.
This means, therefore, that a Europe-wide distribution
scheme, involving a duty for re-sellers or franchisees to make certain expenditures or accept certain contractual burdens, could
be deemed legal in competition terms in Germany but illegal in
France and Portugal. Groups of, for example, car dealers in one
country might successfully challenge terms, whereas their counterparts in another country might lose. The exclusive sale of the
rights to broadcast sporting events, either a championship occurring over a few days or a series of events such as one or several
seasons of soccer games, might seem restrictive in Italy but reasonable in the United Kingdom.

52. White Paper, supra note 17, § 95.
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C. CoordinationBetween the Commission and National Courts
National courts that apply Community competition law have
two special sources of guidance, the Commission and the European Court of Justice ("Court"). The Commission appears to
consider 3 that since it can always intervene to prohibit an agreement "subject only to the principle of resjudicata that applies to
the dispute between the parties themselves," the risk of fragmentation and diversity of outcome can be reduced. I must say that I
doubt the Commission could avoid that risk without expending
huge amounts of time, monitoring national cases so closely that
it has insufficient resources to pursue the big problems it wishes
to concentrate.
The Commission notes 54 that cooperation mechanisms will
need to be erected between the Commission and national courts
so that the Commission is aware of proceedings and problems in
interpretation. It can intervene (subject to leave) as amicus curiae in national proceedings, and ensure that the current Notice
55
on cooperation between the Commission and national courts
be incorporated into Regulation 17 so that national courts can
(more easily) ask the Commission for information in the course
of proceedings. The 1996 Report on Competition Policy discusses the application of the 1993 Notice and notes that, in 1995
and 1996, the Commission answered seven questions put by national courts pursuant to the Notice. Two questions were answered from French courts, three from Spain, one from a German court, and one from a Belgian court.56 The 1997 Report
additionally gives information on three further sets of questions
to which the Commission responded in 1996 (but which were
not noted in the 1996 Report).
The Commission points out that there have been few
problems in the parallel application of Article 81(1) since
1962.58 This is technically true but in no way reassuring. In past
years, parallel application involved a few cases in which a na53. Id. § 102.
54. Id. § 107.
55. Commission Notice, O.J. C 39/6 (1993).

56.

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, XXVITH REPORT ON COMPETITION

Poucy, at 338-40 (1996).

57. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
TION POLICY, at 350-51 (1997).
58. White Paper, supra note 17, § 102.

XXVIITH

REPORT ON COMPETI-
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tional court was analyzing a matter also being examined by the
Commission. The Commission's views were generally deemed
determinative if expressed, and there were not many cases. In
the future, the Commission will be only one voice (and wishes to
see its stature diminish as enforcement is decentralized) and the
cases will be more frequent.
D. References for Preliminary Rulings
More references are likely to go to the Court as a result of
national courts applying Article 81(3) themselves. The Court is
adept at giving helpful answers to judicial inquiries within about
fourteen to eighteen months, and its prestige ensures that every
possible argument is made to it in full. I question how the Court
will cope with a new source of numerous references.
As the Court confirmed in the case of Delimitis 9 a national
court can always seek information from the Commission on the
state of any. competition procedure that the Commission may
have set in motion, on any possible ruling on notified agreements, or on legal and economic information that the Commission can supply. Since the Commission's response time seems to
me (but the evidence is not clear) slower than making a reference, it appears quite possible that national courts may be inclined to stay proceedings and submit a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court. Indeed, the Court in Delimitis noted
that "a stay of proceedings or the adoption of interim measures
should also be envisaged where there is a risk of conflicting deci"
sions in the context of the application of Article 85(1) and 86. 6o
An increase in preliminary ruling requests might help the
coherence of Community law, but at the cost of delay and judicial dislocation and, as the European courts recently noted in a
paper submitted to the European Parliament for discussion,
there is a "dangerous trend towards a structural imbalance" in
the number of cases coming before them (more than half of
which are references for a preliminary ruling).61 They will soon
be unable to cope. The courts note that while
59. Stergios Delimitis v. Henniger Brdu AG, Case C-234/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-935,
[1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 210.

60. Id.
61. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Committees and Delegations,
Notice to Members No. 9/99, DOCEN/CM/378/378160 (May 28, 1999).
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national courts ...should be encouraged to apply Community law themselves, and not to resort too hastily to the solution afforded by a reference to the Court, the fact remains
that the uniform application of Community law frequently
depends on the answer to a question of interpretation raised
before a national court not having to wait the outcome of
appeal proceedings but being given by the Court at the outset, so that the case-law can becomes established at an early
stage in the Member States. of the Union.62
However, the anticipated increase in caseload from non-competition sources in the next few years means that the Commission
makes itself an excellent source of information for national
courts, rather than the court.
The White Paper acknowledges that the end of the notification system will give businesses more responsibility. In paragraph 77, it states:
In a system of ex post control, undertakings would have to
make their own assessment of the compatibility of their restrictive practices with Community law, in the light of the legislation in force and the case-law; this would certainly lighten
the administrative burden weighing on them, but it would
also require them to take on added responsibility.
In a sense this conclusion is fair, while also being rather disingenuous in that it assumes companies have in the past filed notifications every time they encountered problems. Of course, it
makes sense for a company to be guided primarily by its own
legal advisors' analysis of the business situation. It was ridiculous
to pretend that every exclusive agreement or every agreement
containing a territorial scope of action was at risk of prohibition,
voidness, and nullity unless it had received the blessing of DG IV.
In actual practice, companies elected not to seek such blessing
and not to draft contracts as if it were indispensable. So the new
regime will make theory and reality correspond. This situation is
welcoming. It is not clear to me, however, that a company will
be subject to a lesser "administrative burden" in the future than
in the past by relying on its lawyer's opinion when relying on a
notification. The legal environment will certainly become more
complex, in that Article 81 (1) and Article 81 (3), the key consti-

62. Id. at 25.
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tutional texts, will in the future be read concurrently, whereas
up until now they have been read and applied separately.
I note that:
* the number of fora before which legal controversies are
likely to arise has risen, arguably thirty fold. Thus, forum
shopping will be inevitable and indispensable;
* the number of actors whose views may be relevant to the
disposition of an EC-wide competition problem will have
risen to thirty-one;
" it will be difficult except in flagship cases to get one central definitive ruling in Brussels, which will preempt controversies elsewhere.
Indeed, many commentators have advanced the argument that
once the dust has settled and patterns of procedural substantive
approach have emerged, the world will be better "having a multitude of actors, both those with incentives to bring actions under
a single body of law and those responsible to decide cases, results
in an evolution of the best law."6 3
Getting to the greener pastures of the best law will require
navigating some turbulent straits and obscure valleys.
IV. THE PUTATIVE REFORM: VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
My comments on the proposed regulation on vertical restraints 64 can be rather brief because they relate to philosophy
rather than detail. One of the criticisms made of the system of
block exemptions was that the exemption texts became in effect
a code of conduct for industry. The restrictions they permitted
constituted the outer limits of acceptability in a contract. The
lawyer or the client would simply adopt the terms of the block
exemption unthinkingly, instead of considering whether an appreciable restriction of competition was present. In my view, the
most detailed block exemption regulations went further than desirable or necessary in prescribing how parties should arrange
their relationships. Why should it be necessary for licensed
know-how to be recorded in writing in order for the license to be
eligible for an exemption? Why should an agreement of fiftyseven months' duration be exempt under Article 81(3), but not
one of sixty-three months? Why should a block exemption about
63. Forrester, supra note 11, at xi.
64. Forrester, supra note 22.
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the marketing of cars include a list of social protections for dealers? In the 1970s and 1980s, such a level of prescriptiveness was
little resented, maybe because the legal principles were new, and
perhaps also because it was widely believed that the exemption
and notification system worked in accordance with theory. In
any event, future exemption regulations ought to be less detailed, and their drafters should realize that chaos will not be
unleashed if companies are given leeway in drafting their contracts. The laity must be trusted to behave properly without the
perpetual supervision of sin-preoccupied clerics. A restrictive
agreement, which is prohibited and irredeemable under Article
81(3), will not squeak through to validity because of an inadvertently generous block exemption. Also, a basically wholesome
agreement should not become void or arguably void because it
contains a few words that do not fit the block exemption.
One of the merits of Regulation 67/6765 and its successor
Regulation 1983/1983 was that everyone could remember the
three permitted restrictions on selling activities outside the exclusive distributor's territory.66 There were no subtle concepts.
A layman could read, understand, and implement the terms necessary to benefit from the block exemption. It was a great success. The Commission is especially to be commended for the
simplicity of a document dealing with the extremely sensitive
subject of cross-border trade.
By contrast, I respectfully submit that the vertical restraint
proposal could have been drafted in the bad old days of
prescriptiveness. The benefit of the block exemption will
neither apply where market shares (which market?) of buyer or
seller or buyer and seller (combined?) exceed thirty percent,
nor where an indefinite, indirect non-compete obligation is present, and so on. That does not mean that in particular cases
these tests will necessarily be unreasonable or unfair. The Danish hail insurers example shows how slippery a criterion high
market share is. About ninety percent of Danish insurers who
offered farmers insurance against hail created a pool of damage
inspectors and established common criteria for evaluating dam65. Regulation 67/67, 57J.O. 849 (1967).
66. There were once advertisements in London Underground stations that advised
businessmen who did not know the terms of Regulation 17/62 to read the Financial
Times.
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age caused to crops by hail. The Danish market for hail insurance was worth about DKR30 million (roughly US$4.3 million).
The relevant geographic market for hail insurance for farmers
was considered to be national. The agreement between the insurers, which was notified to the Commission on Form A/B, was
clearly restrictive of competition, since it prevented the insurers
from competing on non-price issues such as assessment of damages and competence in evaluating damage on the spot. The
agreement was considered to have a possible effect on intraCommunity trade. The de minimis notice was clearly not applicable, since the parties had an over ninety percent market share.
Nevertheless, the Commission gave clearance on the basis that
the agreement had no Community interest because the relevant
market itself was too small. A copy of the comfort letter was sent
to the Danish competition authority.
I readily agree that it is beneficial for the regulation to apply
to services as well as goods. The text has been drafted, however,
on the assumption that business decisions and contract drafting
are dominated by competition law considerations, and that
agreements will follow precisely the tramlines laid down by block
exemption regulations. In my view, the vertical restraints draft
regulation extends the network of tramlines but is essentially
conservative (with a few exceptions such as the provisions on selective distribution systems). The detailed exposition in Article 3
of the blacklisted situations where the benefit of the block exemption will be lost does not seem easier to understand or much
different from the familiar trio of permitted restrictions upon
the reseller. Speaking more broadly, it seems difficult to reconcile the sweeping radicalism of the proposals on modernization
with the timid, technical, and grudging concessions6 7 of the ver67. Point 10 in the proposed guidelines accompanying the block exemption proposal makes the stunningly bland statement that
the Commission considers that, subject to cumulative effect and hardcore restrictions, agreements between small and medium-sized undertakings as defined in the Annex to Commission Recommendation 96/280/EC, OJ. L 107/
4 (1996) are rarely capable of appreciably affecting trade between Member
States or of appreciably restricting competition within the common market as
long as these undertakings do not hold a dominant position in a substantial
part of the common market.
Proposed Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, O.J. C 270/12 (1999). There are so many
qualifications in this sentence that it could have been lifted from an over-cautious lawyer's opinion.
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tical restraints proposal.
Pursuing the tramlines analogy, while the latter involves the
laying of new tracks to reach a destination not far from that
served by the present tracks, the former proposes ripping up the
tracks altogether. Alarming though the prospect may be both to
passengers and regulators, the bold approach is the wiser one.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTENDED POWERS
OF INVESTIGATION
In this section, the surprising conclusion that I reach is that
the proposed changes in Commission powers of inquiry are inconsistent with the most recent case law of the European Court
of Human Rights (or "ECHR"), and that a fundamental review is
required of the apparently genuine and fundamental incompatibility between the Human Rights Convention and how competition law investigations are conducted, as well as how competition
decisions are made. In short, Article 6 of the Human Rights
Convention prohibits the questions that are incriminating but
which must nevertheless be answered on pain of a fine; 68 and the
procedure by that Commission decisions in competition cases
are reviewed seems likewise not to constitute the action of an
independent and impartial tribunal, as required by Article 6.
A. The Commission's Extended Investigation Powers
One important element proposed in the White Paper is the
restating and reinforcing of the Commission's investigative powers. The changes address the right to ask questions related to
the investigation, and the right to summon persons to the Commission's premises to answer questions. In the White Paper the
Commission describes and justifies what it wishes as follows:
During investigations, the right of authorised Commission officials to ask questions of an undertaking's representatives or staff which are not directly related to documents
found on the premises has sometimes been questioned. In
addition, the system of administrative penalties for supplying
incorrect information is silent on this point.
It is therefore proposed that Article 14 of Regulation 17
be amended to make it quite clear that in the course of an
investigation the authorised Commission officials are empow68. Regulation 17/62, supra note 5, arts. 15(1)(c), 16(1)(d).
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ered to ask the undertaking's representatives or staff any
questions that are justified by and related to the purpose of
the investigation, and to demand a full and precise answer. A
further provision could be introduced under which the
authorised officials would be empowered to draw up official
minutes of the answers given in the course of the investigation. These minutes would be included in the file, and could
be used at later stages of the procedure. As a corollary to this
new provision, the answers given in the course of investigations would be brought within the scope of the penalties for
supplying incorrect information ...
In order to increase the effectiveness of its enquiries the
Commission should also be empowered to summon to its own
premises any person likely to be able to provide information
that might be helpful to its enquiries, and to take minuted
statements. This possibility could be used with respect to the
undertakings that are the subject of the procedure: it would
serve to complement Article 14 by allowing persons to be
questioned who were not present at the time of the investigation. It could70 also be used with respect to complainants and
third parties.

Indeed, the Commission points out that "[m] ost of the national systems of competition law give the authorities power to
summon persons likely to be able to give information relevant to
the investigation. This is the case for example in Belgium,
France and Germany."
B. The European Court of Justice's and the Commission's
Interpretation of the Commission's Investigation Powers
Article 14 of Regulation 17/62 grants the Commission the
power to
undertake all necessary investigations into undertakings and
associations of undertakings. To this end the officials
authorised by the Commission are empowered:
(a) to examine books and other business records;
(b) to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records;
(c) to ask for oral explanations on the spot;
69. White Paper, supra note 17, §§ 112, 113.
70. Id. § 114.
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to enter any premises of land and means of transport of undertakings.
Article 14(3) imposes on the undertakings the duty to "submit to
investigations ordered by decision of the Commission." Article
15 (1) (c) empowers the Commission to "impose on undertakings
...fines of from 100 to 5000 [euros] ...where, intentionally or
negligently... they produce the required books or other business records in incomplete form ... or refuse to submit to an
investigation." In the latter case, the Commission may also require undertakings to pay periodic penalty payments of 50 to
1000 euros per day in order to compel an undertaking to submit
to an investigation. 7 ' Ever since the entry into force of Regulation 17/62, these powers have received a very wide interpretation by the Commission, in parallel to a shift in the nature of on
the spot investigations, from something like a tense audit at
arm's length to the open-ended rummage that is, at least sometimes, the current pattern.
In the White Paper, the Commission "make[s] it quite
clear" that its power already extends to "any questions that are
justified by and related to the purpose of the investigation, and
to demand[ing] a full and precise answer." 72 The Commission
views the explanation in the White Paper as nothing more than a
clarification. The situation, however, is not quite as clear as that.
With regard to Article 14(1) (c) of Regulation 17/62, some commentators took the early view that requests for explanations
must relate to the documents being examined. 73 The Commission evidently does not consider its powers to ask questions as
thus circumscribed. It holds its power to ask questions that must
be answered on pain of fines as much broader. The matter was
raised before the Court in National Panasonic(UK.) Ltd. v. Commission,7 4 in evaluating the relationship between Article 11 of
Regulation 17/62, which gives the Commission the power to re-

71. Id. art.

16(1)(c).

72. Id.
73. Arved Deringer, The Distributionof Powers in the Enforcement of the Rules of Competition Under the Rome Treaty, 1 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 30 (1963); I. Van Bael, EEC Antitrust
Enforcement and Adjudication as Seen by Defence Counsel, 7 REVUE SuIssE Du DROIT INTERNAT1IONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE 1, 15 (1979).
74. National Panasonic (U.K.) Ltd. v. Commission, Case 136/79, [1980] E.C.R.
2033, [1980) 3 C.M.L.R. 169.
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quest information, and Article 14. The Commission's position
was described in the case report as follows:
It is not true to say that the Commission may obtain information by requiring explanations on the spot at the time of an
investigation by means of a decision under Article 14 and
thus avoid the safeguards of the procedure under Article 11.
In fact officials of the Commission undertaking an investigation are empowered to require explanations of specific concrete questions arising out of the books and business records
which they examine, which has nothing to do with the power
to ask general questions requiring careful consideration and
perhaps the gathering of information by the firm. 75
This appears to contradict what the Commission now says
about its own powers in the White Paper, namely that Article 14
should be amended "to make it clear that . . . the authorised
Commission officials are empowered to ask .. . any questions

that are justified by and related to the purpose of the investigation, and to demand a full and precise answer."
Advocate General Warner, confirming what the Commission had said, indicated that Article 14(1) (c) was restricted to
explanations relating to the books and records under examination and their contents. The Court's judgement did not treat
the issue directly. However, in relation to the distinction between Article 11 and 14, the Court stated:
The fact that the officials authorised by the Commission, in
carrying out an investigation, have the power to request during that investigation information on specific questions arising from the books and business records which they examine
is not sufficient to conclude that an investigation is identical
to a procedure intended only to obtain information within
the meaning of Article 11 of the regulation.
C. The So-Called Duty of Active Cooperation
In Fabbrica Pisana, the Commission described what it conceived to be the duty of the company under investigation:
The argument that Fabbrica Pisana had satisfactorily fulfilled
its obligations by generally putting all its files at the investigator's disposal must be rejected, since the obligation on undertakings to supply all documents required by Commission in75. Id.
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spectors must be understood to mean not merely giving access to all files but actually producing the specific documents,
required. Nor can the argument that the Commission's inspectors did not examine the business records of the administration department be accepted, as none of the undertaking's
representatives had told them that the documents requested
were, or might be, kept in that department and where there
was otherwise no reason to suppose
that documents of that
76
nature might be found there.
It cannot be the law that the Commission can order the target
company to produce incriminating documents that the company
itself must choose. Correspondingly, it cannot be the law that
the company can discharge its duty under Regulation 17/62 by
merely showing the Commission the contents of its filing room.
As the Court has acknowledged on several occasions, it is in principle for the Commission, and not the undertaking or third
party, to decide whether a document must be produced.7 7
The well, recognized principle that the Commission cannot
search for information by asking general or open-ended questions must also apply to the Commission's powers of interrogation. The Commission itself recognizes that the power to obtain
explanations must be read in the light of Article 11. The Commission has accepted that "the power should not be used to pressure the officials of a firm into making oral admissions which
they would not make if they had the time for reflection afforded
them by a written request under Article 11."171
These two concessions are important. Questions the Commission may ask must be both specific and capable of being answered in the circumstances of an investigation. 79 It is also relevant that the responsibility established by Regulation 17/62 rests
with the undertaking; only the undertaking may be liable to
76. Commission Decision No. 80/334/EEC, O.J. L 75/30, 32 (1980) (Fabbrica
Pisana).
77. See generally Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case
155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1616, 1617-18, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 264; Hoechst AG v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2819, 2927, 31, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
410; Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, 3347-48, 15, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 502.
78. OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, DEALING
WITH THE COMMISSION: NOTIFICATIONS, COMPLAINTS, INSPECTIONS AND FACT-FINDING POWERS UNDER ARTICLES 81 AND 82 OF THE EC TREATY 40 (1997).

79. See C.S. KERSE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 142 (4th ed. 1998).
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fines or periodic penalty payments under Articles 15 and 16. It
would therefore seem to be up to the undertaking to determine
how it intends to fulfill any obligations it may have under Regulation 17/62. The company should thus be free to select a representative to provide the necessary information. On the other
hand, it would seem "sensible that oral explanations of any document should be given by the person who wrote it, received it,
performed the activity ordered or described in it, or engaged in
discussions about its formation, execution or purpose."8 0 Putting it differently, it seems functionally appropriate that questions should be addressed to the author or actor identified as
knowledgeable, but constitutionally it is for the company to
name the person who will reply. Currently the Commission
names those whom its officials wish to question pursuant to Article 14. So far as we know, the Commission has never condemned a company that has refused to present a specific person
to answer questions under Article 14. Arguably, the Commission
cannot choose or nominate any particular person to reply to its
enquiries or requests for explanations under Article 14. As the
Commission put it in FabbricaPisana, cited above:
It is not for the Commission's inspectors to assess or dispute
the competence or extent of knowledge of the representatives of the undertaking they are investigating. The undertakings named in the investigation authorisations are alone responsible for designating their representatives.
This assertion does not seem to match contemporary practice. Note also that in the long excerpt from the White Paper at
the start of this section, the Commission contemplates questions
to "representatives" (that is, persons designated by the company)
and "staff' (who may be other employees determined by the
Commission who are not designated by the company to reply to
questions). It seems, therefore, that the Commission lacks the
power to question whomever it may consider useful. But this
does not necessarily excuse the undertaking from putting forward whatever employee can best respond to the inspector's
question as the companies are under an obligation to cooperate
actively.
To speak less abstractly, it is not clear from the legal authorities whether a specific person who has guilty knowledge may be
80. Id. at 143.

2000]

MODERNIZATION OFEC COMPETITION LAW

1067

questioned by inspectors, on pain of fines upon his employer if
he is not produced. It is also clear that the Commission's theories as advanced in the White Paper are not identical to those
advanced in court cases and its own brochure. This tension between theoretical power and practical necessity gives rise to genuinely difficult questions that have rarely been examined thoroughly. There is another related and even more fundamental
problem that will now be discussed.
D. Effectiveness of the Investigation and the Protection of
Human Rights
While the proposed extended powers of the Commission
may seem a reasonable and necessary reinforcement of what
must be implicit in any regime for effective antitrust enforcement, it is difficult to reconcile them with the Human Rights
Convention. In short, how may we reconcile the proposed rules
with the recent case law of the human rights institutions in Strasbourg on the duty to give due process rights to companies under
investigation, rights commensurate with those given to those accused of crimes including the right not to incriminate themselves?81 Related to this issue is the natural reluctance of the
Commission and the European courts to see the Commission's
power to make dawn raids and issue Article 11 letters diminished
by having to respect the Human Rights Convention.
Note that in the United States, corporations do not benefit
from the constitutionally, granted immunities that for private citizens constitute parallels to those granted in the Human Rights
Convention. It is therefore necessary to have a regime that permits effective fact gathering by the Commission but which recognizes and respects the principles of the Human Rights Convention.
E. The Relationship Between the Human Rights Convention and
EU Law
So let us review the relationship between the Human Rights
Convention and EC law, beginning at the beginning because this
convention is not familiar terrain for a U.S. antitrust audience.
81. See Helmuth Schr6ter, L'interdependance entre les pouvoirs de la Comm'n et les
garanties procdduralesdont beneficient les individus, in UN R6LE POR LA DkFENSE DANS LES
PROCIEDURES COMMUNAUTAIRES DE CONCURRENCE (Bruylant 1997).

1068

FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 23:1028

In the preamble of the Single European Act, the Member States
affirm that they are
[d]etermined to work together to promote democracy on the
basis of the fundamental rights recognised in the Constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality
and social justice.8 2
These words may sound curiously exotic to an audience accustomed to economic analysis of markets but, as we will see, the
Human Rights Convention has become a surprisingly potent
document. The Member States thus recognized the substance of
the fundamental rights contained in the Human Rights Convention. They did not, however, accept a direct obligation of the EC
to respect the wording or the form these rights are given in national constitutions or in the Human Rights Convention. The
obligation extends to these rights as they may be defined and
elaborated by the Court. The Court was therefore free to interpret the fundamental rights contained in the Human Rights
Convention in the context of EC law, rather than being bound
by the interpretation given tO it by the organs responsible for the
Human Rights Convention, the Human Rights Commission, and
the European Court of Justice.8" The possibility existed that
Member States might have to respect their Human Rights Convention obligations arising from the Human Rights Convention
itself in a different manner than they would respect EC obligations as interpreted by the Court in discharge of the Community's indirect duty to respect the Human Rights Convention.8 4
Article F(2) of the Treaty of European Union went one step
further in recognizing that "[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms...
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to
82. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
83. The recent institutional reorganization of the Human Rights Institutions in
Strasbourg lies beyond the scope of this Essay.
84. This was demonstrated in the Niemietz case (Niemietz v. Germany, No. 251-B
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33-34 (1992)), where the Commission and the Court of Human Rights
disagreed with the Court's interpretation of Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention
in its Hoechstjudgment. Hoechst AG v. Comm'n, Joined Cases 46/87 & 227/88, [1989]
E.C.R. 2819, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 410.
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the Member States as general principles of Community law."8 5
Thus, fundamental rights are still general principles. Henceforth they must be respected "as guaranteed by" the Human

Rights Convention. This should mean that the fundamental
rights guaranteed by the EC are to be interpreted in line with
those guaranteed by the Human Rights Convention (and as in-

terpreted by the Strasbourg organs).
The court in Luxembourg consistently has held that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of
law whose observance it ensures. Accordingly, it will strike down
any measure adopted by a EC institution that is incompatible
with such fundamental rights. 86 As we shall see, the problem lies

not in honoring the principle of fundamental rights, as no one
can be opposed to fundamental rights. The problem lies in de-

fining what conduct is protected by those rights. More specifically, do those rights permit a company to refuse to answer an
unwelcome question from a competition agency and avoid being

punished for its refusal? In my view, recent precedents from the
courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg diverge on this issue. In
Nold,"7 the Court observed at paragraph 13 that,
international treaties for the protection of human rights on
which the Member States have collaborated, or of which they
are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of Community law.

In Johnston,88 the Court emphasized the role reserved for
the-Human Rights Convention in the development of EC law:
As the European Parliament, Council and Commission recognized in their Joint Declaration of 5' April 1977 and as the
85. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1, art. F(2) (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as
amended by SEA, supra note 82. The TEU was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam
amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2,1997, O.J. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty
of Amsterdam]. These amendments were incorporated into the TEU, and the articles
of TEU were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European
Union, O.J. C 340/2 (1997), 37 I.L.M 67 [hereinafter Conslidated TEU], incorporating
changes made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
86. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH. v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 255.
87. Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 14 C.M.L.R. 388.
88. Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Case 222/84,
[1986] E.C.R. 1651, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R. 833.
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Court has recognized in its decisions, the principles on which
that Convention 89is based must be taken into consideration in
Community law.

The institutions of the European Communities were not strictly
speaking, parties to the Human Rights Convention.90 Acts of national institutions of the Member States in implementation or
enforcement of EC acts, however, are reviewable under the
Human Rights Convention.9 1
Twenty years ago in CFDT v. European Commission, the Commission of Human Rights held an application against the EC to
be inadmissible rationepersonae because the EC was not a party to
the Human Rights Convention, and further rejected a submission that the EC Member States-who are all party to the
Human Rights Con'ention-were jointly and severally liable for
the acts of the Community. The European Commission for
Human Rights offered reassurance to the party before it about
respect for human rights:
[T]he legal system of the European Communities not only
secures fundamental rights but also provides for control of
their observance. It is true that the constituent treaties of the
EC did not contain a catalogue of such rights. However, the
Parliament, the Council and the Commission of the European Communities have stressed in a Joint Declaration the
importance they attach to the protection of fundamental
89. Id. at 1682, § 18.
90. See CFDT v. EC, App. No. 8030/77, 13 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 231
(1978); Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention, Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265, pursuant to Article
228(6) of the EC Treaty (Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759.
91. In its decision in M. & Co., the Human Rights Commission refused to uphold
an application against Germany for breach of Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention by enforcing a decision of the Court. The Commission held the application to be
inadmissible, following its decision in CFDT:
A transfer of powers does not necessarily exclude a state's responsibility under
the Convention with regard to the exercise of transferred powers. Otherwise
the guarantees of the Convention could wantonly be limited or excluded and
thus be deprived of their peremptory character ... [the] transfer of powers to
an international organisation is not incompatible with the Convention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights receive an equivalent
protection.
M. & Co. v. Germany, Application 13258/87, 64 Eur. Comm'n Hum. Rts. Decision &
Rep. 138 (1990). The Commission concluded that the Community guarantees sufficient protection and declared the application inadmissible. M. & Co., supra.
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rights, as derived in particular from the constitution of Member States and the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights... In addition, the Court of the European
Communities has developed a case law according to which it
is called upon to control Community acts on the basis of fundamental rights, including those enshrined in the European
Convention on Human Rights.
Subsequently, the Court in Elliniki Radiophona Tileorassi v.
Dimotiki Etairi Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas9 2 emphasized the
position of the European Commission of Human Rights. At paragraph 41 it observed that "the Court draws inspiration from....
guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection
of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated
or of which they are signatories ... The ECHR has special signifi-

cance in that respect."9"
Advocate General Darmon has recognized the importance
of preserving such respect by ensuring parity between the levels
of protection provided by EC law and under the Human Rights
94
Convention. In AlJubail Fertilizer,
he stated:

If the European Commission of Human Rights declares inadmissible applications directed against national decisions enacted pursuant to a Community act ...

the main reason is

that, through its successive judgments the Court [of Justice]
has established the principle that it reviews the Community
institutions' observance of fundamental rights.9 5
Equally, Advocate General Bo Vesterdorf in Rhdne-Poulenc SA, 9 6

while reviewing a number of human rights arguments, stated:
"It is vitally important that the Court should seek to bring about
a state of legal affairs not capable of any justified criticism with
reference to the European Convention."
We may therefore conclude that abundant authority supports the broad principle that the EC institutions, EC competition legislation, and its enforcement must respect the principles
92. Elliniki Radiophona Tileorassi v. Dimotiki Etairi Pliroforissis and Sotirios
Kouvelas, Case C-260/89, [1991] E.C.R. 1-2925, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 540.
93. Id. 41.
94. Al Jubail Fertilizer Co and Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Co. v. Council, Case C-49/
88, 1991 E.C.R 1-3187, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 377.
95. Id. 1 31.
96. Opinion of Advocate General Vesterdorf, Rh6ne-Poulenc SA v. E.C. Comm'n,
Case T-1/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867, 881, § 19.
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of the Human Rights Convention. Let us now examine the concrete application of that principle.
VI. ARTICLE 6 HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION AMD THE
COMMISSION'S EXTENDED INVESTIGATION POWERS
Companies in competition proceedings will desire a level of
security that does not fall below that guaranteed by Article 6 of
the Human Rights Convention, granting the right to a fair hearing. Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention provides inter
alia that:
(1) In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law...
(2)

Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall be pre97
sumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.

In the following, we will briefly examine whether the Commission is to be considered a tribunal for the purposes of Article
6 of the Human Rights Convention, whether an undertaking investigated for infringement of Articles 81 or 82 of the EC Treaty
is facing a "criminal charge," and whether such an undertaking
is entitled to a "fair and public hearing within reasonable time by
an independent and impartial tribunal." This leads us to the key
question of whether the Commission, in light of its proposed. extended investigation powers, must respect the privilege against
self-incrimination.
A. Is the Commission a "Tribunal"for the Purposes of the Human
Rights Convention?
In Fedetab,9" the Court held that the Commission was bound
to respect the procedural guarantees provided by EC law and
had done so, but that it could not be "classed as a tribunal within
the meaning of Article 6" of the Human Rights Convention. In
Musique Diffusion99 and Shell, 10 0 the Court confirmed its position.
97. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2.
98. Heintz van Landewyck Sirl and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases 209-215,
218/78, [1980] E.C.R. 3125, 3248, § 81, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 134.
99. Musique Diffusion v. Commission, Case 100/80, [1983] E.C.R. 1825, 1930,
[1983] 3 C.M.L.R. 221.
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This conclusion is based on the premise that it is the nature
of the decision-making body that determines whether Article 6
applies. As the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed
on many occasions, however, it is the nature of the decision itself
which is decisive. The Fedetab and other cases, therefore, are
plainly wrong or no longer persuasive. They cannot be reconciled with subsequent decisions of the ECHR.
1. The 'Criminal Charge'
As we shall see, the problem posed for competition agencies
in Europe by the language of Article 6 of the Human Rights
Convention is that there is overwhelming recent authority to the
effect that competition cases are "criminal," and that the rights
of the accused in a criminal case include the right to be silent. 10 1
The European Court of Human Rights has given what Eurospeak calls an "autonomous meaning" to the word "criminal"
under the Human Rights Convention. There have been a
number of cases in Strasbourg concerning the meaning of "criminal." Generally, governments have argued that a particular procedure imposing some sort of sanction on an individual is not
really criminal, and generally they have lost. Public authorities
may not deny citizens the protection of the Human Rights Convention merely by describing the legal framework as administrative and not criminal. For example, the European Court of
Human Rights held that "criminal" has an autonomous meaning
for the purposes of Article 6(1) of the Human Rights Convention in the Engel °2 case. A rule may appear criminal, irrespective of the term by which it is characterized in national law. The
nature of the offense and the severity of the possible punishment
would be more reliable indicators. Engel, a conscript who seems
10 3
to have been a trade union organizer for his fellow sufferers,
had been penalized by his commanding officer for offenses
against military discipline. He had appealed as far as the
Supreme Military Court. The European Court of Human Rights
held that the proceedings against him fell within the scope of
100. Shell International Chemical Company v. Commission, Case T-11/89, [1992]
E.C.R. 11-757, 781.
101. G. DANNECKER & J. FiSCHER-FRITSCH, DAS EG-KARTELLRECHT IN DER
BUBGELDPRAXIS (Carl Heymanns Verlag, ed., 1989).
102. Engel and Others v. Netherlands, A22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 81-82 (1976).
103. Literally a barrack room lawyer, it would seem.
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Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention. It also found an infringement of Article 6 due to the fact that hearings of the
Supreme Military Court were held in secret.
In its famous Ozturk' °4 judgment, the European Court of
Human Rights clarified further the notion of a "criminal charge"
for the purposes of Article 6(1). The court confirmed the approach it had taken in Engel so that although an act was not formally classed as criminal, it could be considered as such if it had
the punitive and deterrent aspects characteristic of response to a
criminal offense. The court observed that:
if the Contracting States were able at their discretion, by classifying an offense as 'regulatory' instead of criminal, to exclude the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6
and 7, the application of these clauses would be subordinated
to their sovereign will... [and] ... according to the ordinary
meaning of the terms, there generally come within the ambit
of the criminal law offenses that make their perpetrator liable
to penalties intended, inter alia, to be deterrent and usually
consisting of fines and of measures depriving the person of
his liberty.1" 5
Mr. Ozturk (or, more precisely, his insurers), had to pay a small
amount of money (about DM60) after causing a traffic accident.
The court held that his rights under Article 6 of the Human
Rights Convention had been infringed.
B. How the European Court ofJustice Interpreted Ozturk
The Court logically concluded that fines for breaches of the
competition rules, particularly when they became large in the
1980s, would be criminal in nature. This accords with common
sense: large fines deter and they punish. In Lutz, 10 6 the Court
stated that it was sufficient if the offenses were criminal in nature
as defined by the Human Rights Convention, or if the potential
penalty was so severe as to bring the offense into the "criminal
sphere."
Advocate General Darmon in Orkem considered that the
wide definition of the concept of a person accused of a criminal
offense adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Oz104. Ozturk v. Federal Republic of Germany, A73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984).
105. Id. § 53.
106. Lutz, Englert and N61kenbockhoff, A123 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987).
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turk meant that those accused of competition infringements
might be subject to different rules. 10 7 Subsequent cases before
the European Commission of Human Rights (or "Human Rights
Commission"), however, proved that there was indeed a problem, even in competition cases.
First, in Stenuit, the Human Rights Commission found that a
French Ministerial decision to impose a fine on a company for
alleged anti-competitive behavior in relation to a rigged bid for a
public tender amounted to the determination of a criminal
charge within the sense of Article 6(1) of the Human Rights
Convention. 10 8 The Human Rights Commission considered that
since the aim of the relevant law was to maintain free competition on the French market, "[tihe Order thus affected the general interests of society normally protected by criminal law."
Moreover, the size of the potential fine, up to a maximum of five
percent of an undertaking's annual turnover, was established
that the penalty in question was meant to have a deterrent effect.
This was only half the penalty that may be imposed under Regulation 17/62.
Second, in Bendenoun, the European Court of Human
Rights ruled that the large financial penalties imposed by the
French tax and customs authorities for tax evasion were "criminal" in nature. 0 9 The relevant provisions of French law applied
to all citizens and had a deterrent and punitive purpose. Furthermore, failure to pay the substantial surcharges imposed
could lead to imprisonment.
This has been confirmed in a recent case, Kadubec v.
Slovakia, where the applicant had been convicted of a minor offense (he was alleged to have disturbed boarders at a spa in
Slovakia, perhaps after drinking too much of the local waters)
which was not classified as a criminal offense under the domestic
laws of Slovakia.' 10 The Slovakian government argued that since
the offense was addressed by sanctions that were preventive and
educational in nature and would not be recorded in the individual's criminal record, it did not amount to a "criminal charge"
107.
108.
Socitte] .
109.
noun].
110.

Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283 (CJ.).
Soci&t6 Stenuit v. France, 232-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) [hereinafter
Bendenoun v. France, 284 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) [hereinafter BendeKadubec v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Rec. 1998-VI) (1998).
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within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Human Rights Convention. The European Court of Human Rights, however, did not
agree. It offered three criteria by which the nature of an offense
could be determined: the domestic legal system's classification
of the offense, which was indicative but not conclusive; second,
the nature of the offense; and, lastly, "the nature and degree of
severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring."1 11 The court found that:
The general character of the legal provision infringed by the
applicant, together with the deterrent and punitive purpose
of the penalty imposed on him, suffice to show that the offense was,
in terms of Article 6 of the Convention, criminal in
1 12
nature.'
These cases taken together made it difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the imposition of a fine under EC competition
law was a criminal charge under the autonomous definition
adopted by the European Court of Human Rights for the purposes of Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention. The action
affects the general interests of society (Stenuit)l a3 and is of general applicability (Bendenoun).1 4 The fines are huge. Even
though Regulation 17/62 states that penalties imposed under it
are administrative rather than criminal, a fine of the order of
ECU100,000,000 11 5 seems plainly penal in nature. This is even
clearer when the need to deter is actually invoked in the Commission's decision to justify increasing the fine heavily (for example, an increase of 250% in ABB's case). 11 6 The need for deterrence is also mentioned in the Commission's Guidelines on the
method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of
Regulation No. 17/62 and Article 65(5) of the European Coal
1 17
and Steel Community Treaty.
Following the Stenuit case, the judges in the European
111. Id. § 50.
112. Id. § 52.
113. Sociiti, supra note 108.
114. Bendenoun, supra note 109.

115. As in the 1998 Volkswagen decision. O.J. L 124/60 (1998).
116. Paragraph 169 of Decision 99/60/EC fining ABB ECU 70 million stated that
the "need for deterrence requires that the minimum fine of ECU 20 million envisaged
for a very serious infringement should be weighted by 2.5 to give a starting point of
ECU 50 million." Pre-insulated Pipe Cartel, O.J. L 24/1, at 63 (1999).
117. Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant Article 15(2) of
Regulation No. 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, O.J. C 9/3 (1998).

2000]

MODERNIZATION OFEC COMPETITION LAW

1077

courts in Luxembourg accepted that competition cases were indeed of a penal or quasi-penal nature. In particular, Advocate
General Vesterdorf, in his Opinion in the Polypropylene case,
noted " [i] n this connection considerable importance must be attached to the fact that competition cases of this kind are in reality of a penal nature, which naturally suggests that a high standard of proof is required."'
He went on to state:
In view of the fact-in my view confirmed to some extent by
the judgment of the Court of Human Rights in the Ozturk
case-that the fines which may be imposed on undertakings
pursuant to Article 15 of Regulation No 17/62 do in fact,
notwithstanding what is stated in Article 15(4), have a criminal law character, it is vitally important that the Court should
seek to bring about a state of legal affairs not susceptible of
any justified criticism with reference to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. At all events,
within the framework formed by the existing body of rules
and the judgments handed down hitherto it must therefore
be sought to ensure that legal protection within the Community meets the standard otherwise regarded as reasonable in
Europe. 119
To similar effect, we may note that Advocate General
Darmon in Woodpulp,120 comparing the adoption of a measure of
general effect to that of a Commission decision in competition
proceedings, said "[a] Commission decision in the field of competition is another matter entirely, particularly where it orders a
trader to pay a fine and is therefore manifestly of a penal na12 1
ture."
C. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The Ozturk2 2 case had obvious relevance for EC competi118. Rh6ne-Poulenc SA and Others v. Commission,Joined Cases T-1 to 4/89, 6 to
15/89, [1991] E.C.R. 11-867.
119. Id. at 881-86.
120. Ahlstrohm Osakeyhtio and Others v. Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases C-89/81, 104/81, 114/81, 116/81, 117/81 & 125-129/81, [1993]
E.C.R. 1-1307, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. 407.
121. Id. 1551, § 451, [1993] 4 C.M.L.R. at 407 (emphasis added); see alsoJulian
Joshua, Proof in ContestedEEC Competition Cases: A Comparisonwith the Rules ofEvidence in
Common Law, 12/5 EUR. L. REv. 315 (1987) (written by DG IV official who has prosecuted many cartels).
122. Ozturk v. Federal Republic of Germany A73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984).
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tion law. Regulation 17/62 says that fines imposed pursuant to
its provisions are administrative, and the Commission has consistently denied that criminal rights should be extended to
targets in competition cases. The Orkem and Solvay 12 3 cases offered an opportunity to consider the implications. More precisely, those cases raised the question of whether there was something akin to the privilege against self-incrimination in responding to decisions requesting information under Article 11 of
Regulation 17/62. The companies argued that the decisions in
question improperly sought to force them to incriminate themselves. The Court noted that the terms of Regulation 17/62 recognize no such right, but instead called for active cooperation
from the party investigated. Examining the question from the
point of view of fundamental rights, the Court found that while
the legal systems of the Member States generally recognize a
right for a physical person in a penal procedure not to testify
against himself, they do not recognize such a right for legal persons (companies) accused of infringing economic law and competition law in particular. It reached similar conclusions with regard to the Human Rights Convention, and the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights.
Thus the Court denied that the companies enjoyed Human
Rights Convention privileges. They fared, however, better when
it came to defendant rights.
Whilst the Commission is entitled... to compel an undertaking to provide all necessary information concerning such
facts as may be known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary,
such documents relating thereto as are in its possession, even
if the latter may be used to establish, against it or another
undertaking, the existence of anti-competitive conduct, it
may not, by means of a decision calling for information, undermine the rights of defence of the undertaking concerned.
Thus, the Commission may not compel an undertaking to
provide it with answers which might involve an admission on
its part of the existence of an infringement
which it is incum12 4
bent upon the Commission to prove.
Based on these criteria, the Court approved requests for factual
information concerning meetings, the identity of the partici123. Orkem v. Commission, Case 374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 3283, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R.
502; Solvay v. Comm'n, Case 27/88, [1989] E.C.R. 1-3355.
124. Id.
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pants, and the documents relating thereto. Questions relating
to initiatives on prices were approved to the extent that they related to the subject and modalities of these initiatives, but disapproved to the extent that they related to their objectives. A question, which aimed to obtain details on "every step or concerted
measure which may have been envisaged or adopted to support
initiatives," was deemed to be of a nature that obliged the applicant to admit guilt.
D. Is There a Right to Silence in Competition Cases?
This leads us to the implications for the Commission's fact
gathering procedures of the applicability of Article 6 of the
Human Rights Convention to competition cases. In particular,
do parties under investigation for competition law infringements
enjoy a right of silence? The Court considered this issue in
Orkem:
As far as Article 6 of the European Convention is concerned,
although it may be relied upon by an undertaking subject to
an investigation relating to competition law, it must be observed that neither the wording of that article nor the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights indicate that it
upholds the right not to give evidence against oneself.1 25
Advocate General Darmon was also skeptical, stating at paragraph 133 of his Opinion that "[h]aving regard to the Decisions
so far adopted by the judicial authorities operating under the
Convention, the opinion that any of the paragraphs of Article 6
upholds the right not to give evidence against oneself is confined to the sphere of academic legal literature."
These doubts notwithstanding, the landmark decision of
the European Court of Human Rights on self-incrimination was
handed down in Funke v. France.12 6 Mr. Funke was suspected by
the French fiscal authorities of having assets abroad. A request
for information was made. If he refused to reply, then he could
be fined under France's extremely severe customs laws (still applicable today, and still ferocious). If he answered accurately,
then he would be admitting to infringements of these laws and
exposing himself to a penalty. The court held that Article 6 (1)
of the Human Rights Convention protects: "the right of anyone
125. Id.
126. Funke v. France, 256-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
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'charged with a criminal offense,' within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Article 6, to remain silent and not to
127
contribute to incriminating himself."
This case has subsequently been confirmed by the court's
decisions in Murray v. United Kingdom12 ' and Saunders v. United
Kingdom. 129 The latter case arose out of the Guinness' takeover
of Distillers, and concerned the U.K. laws that compelled Mr.
Saunders to answer questions, which later formed the basis for
his prosecution for illegal share dealings. The court held that
"[t] he Court recalls that, although not specifically mentioned in
Article 6 of the Convention, the right to silence and the right
not to incriminate oneself are generally recognized international
standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure
under Article 6.130
In Saunders the European Court of Human Rights also rejected the argument advanced by the U.K. Government that the
difficulty of gathering evidence in such cases as white-collar
fraud should allow a departure from the principles of fairness
governing an investigation. The court made clear, at paragraph
74, that "the general requirements of fairness contained in Article 6, including the right not to incriminate oneself, apply to
criminal proceedings in respect of all types of criminal offense
without distinction from the most simple to the most com13
plex." 1
E. The Response of the Luxembourg Courts: No Infringement
In the PVCl3 2 case this summer, the European Court of First
Instance was required to take a position on the human rights
implications of these cases. It heard arguments on Funke and
Saunders (prior to the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in that case) and was invited to reassess its judgment in Orkem. The applicants argued that information had
been obtained under duress within the meaning of the case law
127. Id. 44.
128. Murray v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Rec. 1996-I, No. 1) (1996).
129. Saunders v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H°R. (Rec. 1996-VI, No. 24) (1996).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV and Others v. Comm'n, Joined Cases T305-7/94, 313-16/94, 318/94, §§ 444, 447-49 (CFI Apr. 20, 1999) (not yet reported).
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of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court
of Human Rights answered this contention as follows:
Regulation 17 does not give an undertaking under investigation any right to refuse to comply with an investigative
measure on the ground that evidence that it had infringed
the rules on competition might thereby be obtained. On the
contrary, it places the undertaking under a duty of active cooperation, which means that it must be prepared to make any
information relating to the object of the inquiry available to
the Commission .... However, in order to ensure the effectiveness of Article 11(2) and (5) of Regulation No 17, the
Commission is entitled to compel an undertaking to provide
all necessary information concerning such facts as may be
known to it and to disclose to it, if necessary, such documents
relating thereto as are in its possession, even if the latter may
be used to establish, against it or another undertaking, the
existence of anti-competitive conduct[.]
The recognition of an absolute right of silence, as argued
for by the applicants, would go beyond what is necessary to
preserve the defense rights of undertakings and would constitute an unjustified hindrance to the Commission in the accomplishment of its task.
The Commission may not, however, by a decision to request information, undermine the undertaking's defense
rights. Thus it may not compel an undertaking to provide it
with answers which might involve an admission on its part of
the existence of an infringement which it is incumbent upon
the Commission to prove.'
The PVCjudgment, which merely reiterates the Orkemjurisprudence, sits uneasily with the European Court of Human
Rights' judgment in Saunders. I respectfully submit that it is difficult to reconcile the Strasbourg finding that an individual cannot be compelled to furnish factual data, which may be the basis
for charging him with economic crime, with the Luxembourg
finding that it is acceptable to compel the handing over of documents and responses to concrete questions, which do not demand a confession but do demand incriminating evidence. It is
clear that the judges of the Court of First Instance understood
the problem, but I respectfully submit that their conclusion is
not completely satisfying. The inconvenience of conceding a
133. Id. §§ 444, 447-49.
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right ought not, a priori, to justify denying that right if it exists.
The denial of an absolute right to silence is likely to be reexamined in the future cases. In particular, the right of the Commission to ask direct questions to individuals working for companies
under investigation, will need to be reexamined."'
There are obviously serious difficulties that will confront the
Commission's services if indeed its policies for gathering evidence are not lawful, but alternative procedures could be
imagined which would broadly achieve the same functional goal.
It should be noted that there is nothing improper about asking
questions. It is the fine threatened if no answer is given which
vitiates the fairness of the procedure. I submit that it is appropriate to think seriously about the problem of incompatibility
with the Human Rights Convention before Regulation 17/62 is
redrafted.
Since I have devoted so much space to the subject of one
aspect of Article 6 of the Human Rights Convention, I take the
liberty of adding some further thoughts about other Human
Rights Convention issues associated with competition cases.
VII. DOES THE PROCEDUREBEFORE THE COMMISSION
COMPLY WITH ARTICLE 6? IS THE COMMISSION AN
INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL?
It is useful to examine separately the various elements,
which are required by Article 6 with respect to the "determination" of a "criminal charge." The elements are a "fair and public
hearing" by an "independent and impartial tribunal established
by law."
A. Public Hearing
Commission proceedings are largely written, but there is
provision for oral hearings and any defendant may request one.
Therefore the requirement of a hearing is met. The hearing,
however, is not held in public.1 35 As long as the hearings before
the Commission are not public, the procedure before the Com134. Pellisier and Sassi v. France, App. No. 25444/94, _ Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. _ (Mar. 25, 1999) (concerning offense of criminal bankruptcy on issue of evidence
and proof).
135. See Commission Regulation No. 99/63, art. 9(3), 0.J. L 127/2268 (1963)
[hereinafter Regulation 99/63].
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mission is not public. I am not much troubled by this phenomenon, as most companies would be reluctant to attend a public
hearing, and the mischief of secret trials seems therefore to be
absent.
B. The Right to an Adversarial Trial
Although there is no set procedure laid down in the Regulations, the oral hearings are regularly organized as follows:
(a)

the Hearing Officer opens the hearing and invites the
case-handler to summarize briefly the facts and principal arguments of the Commission;

(b)

the party being heard is then given the opportunity to
speak on the subject matter of the case;

(c)

the representatives of the Member States are invited
by the Hearing Officer to put any questions they may
have to the party, and the party may reply;

(d)

questions may be put by the Hearing Officer and other members of the Commission's staff who are present, and the party may reply;
before closing the oral hearing, the Hearing Officer
may invite the party to make any final or concluding
remarks or observations.

(e)

Where a complainant is present, the procedure may take on
"something of an adversarial character, the complainant being
given an opportunity to put forward his argument before stage
(b) and to reply to the points made by the party at the appropriate time."' 3 6 In AKZO Chemie v. Commission,' Advocate General
Otto Lenz, however, pointed out that the presence of a complainant did not make the proceedings adversarial in character:
The complainant is limited to a role that corresponds to the position, under criminal proceedings, of a person who reports the
matter to the authorities.
The purpose of the hearings before the Commission is to
enable the accused undertaking to be heard. 3 The accused
136. KERSE, supra note 79, at 194.
137. Azko Chemie v. Comm'n, Case 53/81, [1986] E.C.R. 1965, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R.
231.
138. Regulation 17/62, supra note 5, art. 19(2); Regulation 99/63, supra note 131,
art. 9, 0.J. L 127/2268 (1963).
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may disagree with the Commission's case, but is not entitled to
demand answers (they may sometimes be offered). Usually parties' arguments are noted rather than debated. The Commission hearing, rather than being adversarial, is a somewhat unilateral hearing by one party of the other's arguments. Whatever we
may think of the hearings (and I consider they could usefully be
more interactive and involve actual bilateral debate), they are
not a hearing by an independent tribunal. Although the accused company is given access to the non-confidential documents held by the Commission, these documents may conceal
the name of a complainant. The absence of a defendant's right
to examine the Commission's witnesses may be even more significant if the Commission is granted the right to summon persons
to its premises and ask employees questions. As the parties at
the hearing currently cannot examine the witnesses who have
tendered the evidence that the Commission relies upon, there
may be a failure to respect the principle of "equality of arms." In
general, it is not clear to me that the procedures at the administrative level inside the Commission prior to the imposition of a
fine satisfy the requirement of a "fair and public hearing... by
an independent tribunal established by law."
After the hearing, the case is passed for an opinion to the
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Monopolies,
whose delegates represent the Member States' interests. 13 9 In
the context of this procedure, the Hearing Officer has the right
to address the Commissioner responsible for competition matters. The opinion of the Committee and any communication between the Hearing Officer and Commissioner do not involve the
participation of the accused undertaking. Neither the opinion
nor the communication by the Hearing Officer is revealed to the
accused party. Again it seems plain that this is not in any sense a
fair or public hearing before a tribunal. It does not help the
procedure's validity under Article 6 which states that the documents in question are never or almost never made available to
the accused.
C. FairHearing by an Independent and Impartial Tribunal
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the "independent" and "impartial" requirements have to be read to139. See Regulation 99/63, supra note 132, art. 10, O.J. L 127/2268 (1963).
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gether. In Demicoli v. Malta,"4 the applicant was charged with
contempt of the Maltese House of Representatives by satirizing
two of its members. Pursuant to Maltese law, he was tried and
convicted before the House of Representatives, from which
there was no appeal. The court held that the fact that the two
satirized members brought the complaint and participated in
the decision was sufficient to negate the independence and impartiality of the Maltese House of Representatives in this procedure. The court explained:
a tribunal is characterised in the substantive sense of the term
by its judicial function, that is to say determining matters
within its competence on the basis of rules of law and after
proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner .... It must
also satisfy a series of further requirements-independence,
in particular of the Executive; impartiality; duration of its
members' terms of office; guarantees afforded by its procedure-several of which appear in the text of Article 6 (1) itself.
In the Shell case (Polypropylene),14 ' the European Court of
First Instance held that the fact that the same official was responsible for bringing the case and drafting the Decision did not involve a breach of the rights of the defense under EC law. This is
difficult to reconcile with the decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria,142 where the court
held that the participation of an examining magistrate in a hearing on the substantive issues in a criminal trial cast doubt on the
impartiality of the tribunal.
In EC competition proceedings, the caseworker handles the
case from investigation through to the drafting of the decision.
Many hands will contribute to the drafting process, but the
caseworker will normally be the principal drafter. By the time
the hearing or the adoption of the decision draws near, the
caseworker and his or her colleagues at service level will already
be confident that there is a serious enough breach of Articles 81
or 82 to warrant a decision imposing a fine. It is practically impossible for the case-handler to be impartial: he or she is a prosecutor. That in itself is not surprising, but it is relevant to con140. Demicoli v. Malta, 210 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).

141. Shell International Chemical Company v. Comm'n, Case T-11/89, [1990]
E.C.R. 11-637, 781.
142. Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria, 227 Eur. Ct H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
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sider whether the decision in itself is tainted by being associated
with the caseworker as prosecutor. The actual decision is rendered by the College of Commissioners, a political organ. The
members of the Commission are political appointees. They are
not independent of the executive: they are the executives. They
are not, either generally or when taking a competition decision,
similar to a tribunal, which independently renders a neutral conclusion on the basis of the evidence and arguments. A competition decision is the endorsement of months and years of effort
devoted by skilled and resourceful officials who are the civil service subordinates of the Commissioners taking the decision. I
was never much impressed by the argument in the 1970s that the
Commission was prosecutor, judge, and jury, as that reproach
seemed largely irrelevant to the actual situation of DG IV. It
seems to me, however, that the imposition of a fine of
ECU102,000,000 on a company by a political body whose representative then describes to the press its reasons for imposing the
fine in what may fairly be called triumphalist terms does not
clearly constitute the "determination of . . . any [criminal]
charge.., by an independent and impartial tribunal."
This is not to accuse individual officials, junior or senior, or
individual Commissioners, of being unfair or acting unfairly. I
make no such assertion. I, however, am struck by the apparent
discrepancies between the requirements of the Human Rights
Convention and actual practice.
D. Can the Possibility of Appeal to the European Courts Remedy a
Breach of Article 6?
In Stenuit, it was argued that while the administrative procedure itself was not compatible with Article 6, the possibility of an
appeal to the Conseil d'Etat remedied this defect. The Human
Rights Commission, however, noted that the French Court had
refused to examine the factual basis for the imposition of a fine
by a Minister, and concluded that the defendant's case "was in
fact never heard by a tribunal having full jurisdiction which
could have determined the criminal charge against it." The incompatibility of the "administrative" procedure with Article 6
could therefore not be rectified by the possibility of an inadequate judicial review. This implies that one solution to the problem described above could be the comprehensive review of the
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decision by a European court that is independent and impartial.
Judicial review is of course available, but it is not obvious to me
that its current form would completely solve the difficulty. The
Court does not itself take the decision or set the fine. Its role is
not to decide whether the underlying infringement did actually
occur, but whether the decision imposing the fine was lawful. It
is a court for the review of the law, not a de novo review of
whether the accused was guilty. The classic formulation is that
the Court limits its review to verifying whether the relevant procedural rules have been complied, whether the statement of the
reasons for the decision is adequate, whether the facts have been
accurately stated, and whether there has been any manifest error
of appraisal or a misuse of powers. It is not the role of the Court
to retry the determinations made by the Commission. If these
determinations had been purely administrative, then there
would be no problem under Article 6. But since the decision
was in nature criminal, and since the penalty may have been very
severe, I feel that the question of compatibility with Article 6 remains unanswered. If the original decision constitutes the determination of a criminal charge without the involvement of an independent and impartial tribunal, then a review of the legality of
that decision by an independent and impartial tribunal does not,
or at least does not obviously, eliminate the incompatibility with
Article 6.14
CONCLUSION
The Commission itself, it seems, recognizes the need to
make a good balance between effectiveness of competition law
investigations and the rights of the defense, once its investigative
powers are extended:
There are several ways to ensure that the investigations are
simultaneous and consistent, and to strengthen the guaran143. For an interesting discussion of whether the withholding of incriminating information by a company suspected of a competition law infringement can in turn obstruct national enforcement proceedings, see G. Cumming, Otto v. Post Bank and the
Privilege against Self-incrimination in Enforcement Proceedings of EC Articles 85 and 86 before
the English Courts, 16/7 EUR. COMp. L. REv. 400 (1995) (concluding that "as such, the
European Comm'n is henceforth prevented from using any directly incriminating in-

formation which emanates from interrogatories employed in national proceedings.
This prohibition on using relevant and available information might be said to constitute a form of secondary privilege").
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tees offered to undertakings under investigation. The element ofjudicial review could be centralised, and entrusted to
one of the Community courts. This method of safeguarding
the rights of undertakings under investigation would have the
advantage of greatly simplifying investigation procedures, and
resolving once and for all the problems of inconsistency and
lack of simultaneity. Another possibility would be to harmonise and simplify the procedural law in the Member States, so
as to ensure that in any Member States where orders were
needed they could be obtained rapidly and simultaneously.
This second option is a great deal more complex, and would
require far-reaching amendment
ofjudicial procedural law in
1 44
certain Member States.
I readily concede that the foregoing section reaches a surprising
conclusion: I was indeed myself surprised to reach it. It, however, seems prudent to review these matters now, before reforms
are made, so as to ensure the future compatibility of the enforcement mechanism established by EC law with the requirements of
the Human Rights Convention. I submit that before the proposed reforms are made, some fundamental stocktaking is appropriate.

144. White Paper, supra note 17, § 111.

